Code-switching in Arab media discourse

by

Mu Tong, BA; MAC

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2009

Code-switching in Arab media discourse

Approved by
Supervising Committee:

_____

_____

Abstract

Code-switching in Arab media discourse

Mu Tong, MA

The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

Supervisor: Karin Wilkins

This study examines the language situation in the media discourse on *The Opposite Direction*, al-Jazeera's flagship talk show hosted by Faisal al-Qasim. It investigates the phenomenon of code-switching between Standard Arabic and different spoken vernaculars during the talk exchange. Theories of code-switching proposed by Gumperz, Giles, and Myers-Scotton et al. are introduced after the history of Arabic discourse analysis is briefly discussed. In order to explain under what conditions code-switching happens, I choose to observe and analyze instances of code-switching in four episodes of the program, focusing on the communicative functions and motivations for language choice. The applicability of relevant theories is examined to find the theories that best account for speakers' engaging in code-switching in the pan-Arab media discourse.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

A historical review of Arabic discourse analysis 4

Theories 8

Theoretical foundations 8

Conceptualizing the key concepts 11

Diglossia 11

Code-switching 14

Methodology 21

The contextual background 21

Why studying al-Jazeera's *The Opposite Direction* 24

Data collection 25

Data analysis 27

Example one 27

Example two 30

Example three 36

Example four 39

Conclusion 43

Accounting for code-switching 43

Applicability of relevant theories 44

Appendix A A list of episode titles of *The Opposite Direction* 47

Appendix B Translation of the opening questions for episodes analyzed 57

Bibliography 60

Vita 64

CODE-SWITCHING IN ARAB MEDIA DISCOURSE

Introduction

Arab countries have been described as a diglossic society, in which a high language variety - Standard Arabic and a low variety - the local dialect exist side by side. In this diglossic situation as defined by Ferguson (1959), the two varieties are markedly different and their functions tend to be separated. According to Ferguson, the high variety is generally used in formal settings, at school, for university lectures, and on television, just to mention a few; the low variety is used by the majority of speakers in informal contexts in daily life. This "high-low" dichotomy introduced by Ferguson has justified the notion of diglossia to a large extent, with the pan-Arab media discourse being considered as a prime example of the use of the high variety - Standard Arabic.

However, the evolving process of language selection is not automatic and natural in this pan-Arab platform. Although Standard Arabic is extensively used for formal spoken purposes, it was not until the flourish of transnational media in the Arab world that Standard Arabic has been largely used for broadcasting. Before that, different dialects had been used in terrestrial television broadcasting. A glance at the history of electronic media in the Arab world would suffice to explain this phenomenon. In the post-colonial era, terrestrial media were set up solely to preserve political regimes and rally support for local governments (Amin 1996). In the meantime, external mass media content was largely limited in this "tribal" (rather than pan-Arab) media frame, and only apolitical Egyptian films and soap operas could overstep this bound. As a result, most daily broadcast programs were in various Arabic vernaculars with few in Standard Arabic

in this period of time. On the contrary, transnational media differentiate greatly from terrestrial ones in terms of agenda setting: while terrestrial television broadcasting is out of state regime initiatives, transnational media stress a pan-Arab agenda (Kraidy 1998). Hence, every transnational media outlet has extensively used Standard Arabic in order to attract the largest audience possible in the Arab world, and the Arab world has witnessed a new type of media discourse that transcends national boundaries. The intimate relationship between Standard Arabic and the Arab transnational media discourse has been further described by a number of media scholars and others interested in the Middle East. For example, Yasir Suleiman (1999, 2003), Noha Mellor (2005), and Marc Lynch (2006), among others, have noticed the role of Standard Arabic in Arab media in creating a public sphere that affects a nationalist ideology and serves a transnational function in the Arab region.

Yet, a close observation of the language use on the debate shows in this pan-Arab media arena reveals that the switching between Standard Arabic and non-standard vernaculars is not an uncommon phenomenon. Observing al-Jazeera's famously controversial debate show *The Opposite Direction*, for example, one will find that many of the speakers, including the host Faisal al-Qasim himself, while using Standard Arabic most of the time, seem not to hesitate to resort to any spoken vernaculars from time to time. This is rather an interesting phenomenon, for the code-switching being observed here seems to contradict Ferguson's notion of diglossia. Thus, the central question of this study is: Under what circumstances does code-switching happen in pan-Arab media discourse? Further, the study asks: What theories best explain the discourse functions and motivations for code-switching? To be more specific, the study examines the applicability of Gumperz's "interactional sociolinguistic" approach, Giles' accommodation theory and Myers-Scotton's markedness model to the analysis of

processes of communication. Before moving on to a discussion of theories of code-switching, in the section immediately below, I offer a brief discussion of the historical background of Arabic discourse analysis.

A Historical Review of Arabic Discourse Analysis

Since the 1960s, a growing number of scholars have devoted themselves to research in Arabic discourse analysis and communication theory. As Fakhri (2009) has accurately pointed out, due to the predominance of the Standard Arabic as the prestige language of the Quranic tradition and literary heritage, many, if not most, of the studies have focused on written standard Arabic rather than on spoken vernaculars. Among the studies of Arabic written texts, many have focused on such specific characteristics of Arabic as being repetitive, parallel and paratactic (Al-Jubouri 1983; Johnstone 1987, 1990, 1991; Holes 1995; etc.). Al-Jubouri (1984) is one of the pioneers studying the phenomenon of repetition and parallelism in Arabic. He pinpoints three levels of repetition, namely, repetition at morphological level, at word level, and at the "chunk" level, with "chunk" being interpreted as "sentence" or "sentence-like structure" (Al-Jubouri 1983, 107). Al-Jubouri further investigates repetition at the chunk level and identifies parallelism and paraphrase as two major processes of manifestation at this level (Ibid). Johnstone also has noted the prevalence of repetition in contemporary Arabic at all levels and argues that repetition, parallelism and paraphrase work as persuasive devices in Arabic discourse. In *Repetition in Arabic Discourse*, she explicitly argues that "repetition creates linguistic cohesion by evoking classes of items; it creates persuasive force by creating classes; and in doing each of these things it creates language" (Johnstone 1991, 119).

While many linguists examine the cohesive phenomena such as repetition and structural parallelism in Arabic, others have followed a tradition of contrastive rhetoric. Fakhri (1995), for example, investigated the topical structure of English and Arabic expository texts in an attempt to "understand the topical structure in the English writing

of Arab ESL learners" and "determine whether potential differences between the two languages result in transfer in the English writing of Arab ESL learners, or whether these learners use an altogether different topical structure indicative of developmental factors" (Fakhri 1995, 155-66). Another example is Fareh (1998), who has conducted, within the framework of contrastive studies, the functions of the English connective *and* and the Arabic *wa* in English and Arabic written discourse. His conclusion is that the relationship between the functions of *and* and *wa* is not a one-to-one correspondence and sometimes more than one English connective are needed to replace a *wa* to avoid awkwardness in English translation while on the other hand, oftentimes it is necessary to add Arabic connectives between sentences to avoid unnaturalness in Arabic translation. Al-Batal (1990) also looks into the discourse functions of connectives such as *wa* - "and," *lakin* - "but" and *fa* - "and so." As he maintains, Standard Arabic "seems to have a connecting constraint that requires the writer to signal continuously to the reader, through the use of connectives, the type of link that exists between different parts of the text. This gives the connectives special importance as text-building elements and renders them essential for the reader's processing of text" (Al-Batal 1990, 256).

Indeed, these various linguistic studies on Arabic discourse have put in solid efforts to deepen and extend knowledge about the developing field and have made tremendous contribution to the field of discourse analysis as a whole. Yet, most of the studies are motivated, to a large extent, by pedagogical concerns with second language acquisition, and as a result, the focus of these studies has been largely on the language forms, or the "linguistic competence," a concept developed by the linguist Noam Chomsky to denote a person's knowledge of the meaning of sentences and their ability to produce grammatically correct sentences. This approach to linguistic studies, as Gumperz argues, holds the view that "human cognition can be described in terms of abstract,

relationally defined, context free symbolic categories" (Gumperz 1982, 11). As a result, the empirical study of actual speech behavior is considered no more than "a means to an end" in the analysis and the signaling mechanisms such as intonation, speech rhythm are believed not to affect the meaning of a message (Ibid, 12). Although Chomsky's theories about language structure investigate in detail the complex nature of language systems, it is however this shift of focus to unobservable and context-free linguistic knowledge that makes the Chomskyan approach narrow in scope. After all, it is the use of language that is the fundamental feature of language, not a meta-language that is independent of language. And as a result, Chomsky's program has become the target of many empiricist criticisms.

In contrast to the relatively large body of research that focuses on the linguistic competence, there exist a relatively small group of sociolinguistic studies that have adopted a "communicative competence" approach to investigate Arabic discourse. "Communicative competence" is a concept proposed by Dell Hymes to attack on the narrow conception of Chomskyan linguistics. As explained by Gumperz, "[w]hereas linguistic competence covers the speaker's ability to produce grammatically correct sentences, communicative competence describes his ability to select from the totality of grammatically correct expressions available to him, forms which appropriately reflect the social norms governing behavior in specific encounters" (Gumperz 1972, 205). Here the key point is that there must be other kinds of knowledge, in addition to the knowledge of the language, that make possible the effective use of language. In this regard, Widdownson quite rightly comments that "there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless" (Widdownson 1995, 95).

Within the rather broad domain of Arabic sociolinguistics, where the focus has moved to language usage in a socio-cultural context and to how language functions in

interactions in the real world, Ferguson's well-known article "Diglossia" (1959) marks a milestone. His model, by incorporating the spoken language, shifts away from the tradition of interpreting written Arabic texts. His proposal that there is a high variety that is learned in schools and a low variety that is acquired naturally still seems valid and the concept of "diglossia" has soon become an indispensable concept for a corpus of sociolinguistic works. Taking the initial inspiration from "Diglossia," a number of Arabic sociolinguists have started concentrating on "variety and variation" (Suleiman 1995, ix). Holes (1983, 1987, 1995), for example, has continuously explored the relationship between dialect change and social structural changes in the Arab world. Another good example is Haeri's (1996) sociolinguistic investigations in Cairo, in which she rationalizes the preference of Cairene women for using pronunciations belonging to the vernacular varieties rather than Standard Arabic, leading to her conclusion that gender has played an important role in the progress of linguist change and women are more "innovative" than men in their speech. On the other hand, Yasir Suleiman represents a prime example of a small but growing number of scholars who have made tremendous achievements in dealing with the crucial role of the Arabic language in marking and preserving the national identity, in unifying the society, and in articulating the pan-Arab ideology (e.g. Suleiman et el. 1994, 1999, 2003, etc.). Still, as Suleiman himself acknowledges, many of the studies on Arabic discourse that investigate the relationship between language and society have arisen as a consequence of the "theoretical and methodological advances emanating from Labov's work" (Suleiman 1994, ix). Conversely, few anthropological linguistics that carry out linguistic ethnographies have appeared to offer a "more detailed, complex, and realistic analysis of the language situations," as noted by Haeri (2000, 67).

Theories

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Labov's variationist approach, also referred to as the "social factors" approach, holds the view that the crucial forces behind linguistic choices lie in the larger community, and as a result, "[i]ndividual behavior can be understood only as a reflection of the grammar of the speech community," and "[l]anguage is not the property of the individual, but of the community" (Labov 1989, 52). It is thus the speech community that becomes the primary object of Labov's linguistic investigation. For example, in his (1966) study of the employees of three major New York department stores, Lavob examines the loss of postvocalic "r" in their speech (e.g. "fourth" is pronounced "foth") and looks for a correlation between social class stratification and different ways of saying the same thing. The impression is that little about the individual speakers has to be understood while the cumulative effect of observing many of them is what matters. This top-down approach certainly has not been shared by many anthropological linguists.

This anthropological linguists' ethnographic research, which can be also categorized as "sociolinguistics," has "shifted the analytical issue ... to questions such as how and by what signaling devices language functions to evoke the contextual presuppositions that affect interpretation and how to determine what presuppositions are at work in particular talk exchanges" (Gumperz 1999, 456-7). As such, these studies position language in its social context by means of communication rather than language itself, and shift the focus from communities to actual talk and performance as the principle basis of analysis. Among the anthropological linguists are Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, Dell Hymes, John Gumperz, and others.

Garfinkel, a forerunner in ethnographies, is justly famous for his ethnographical experiments that unveil the techniques people use to construct their social world and maintain social order. His (1967) analysis of Agnes, an inter-sexed person, is deemed the sacred text for ethnographic research. Goffman is another representative of ethnographic scholars, who as well believes in the functional essentiality of individual's performances in generating, maintaining and renegotiating social order. As he states in his famous and widely published book *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, "when an individual appears before others he will have many motives for trying to control the impression they receive of the situation. This report is concerned with some of the common techniques that persons employ to sustain such impressions and with some of the common contingencies associated with the employment of these techniques" (Goffman 1959, 15). Hymes's contribution, as Gumperz points out, lies in his insights that "instead of seeking to explain talk as directly reflecting the beliefs and values of communities, structuralist abstractions that are notoriously difficult to operationalize, it should be more fruitful to concentrate on situations of speaking or ... speech events" (Gumperz 2003, 215).

Gumperz, mainly concerned with the interaction through which the speakers signal and interpret meaning, has initiated an innovative strand of ethnographic work referred to as "interactional sociolinguistics." Whereas many conversational analyses have yielded insights into the interactive nature of conversation, they still tend to take for granted the conversational cooperation and the inferring process. Interactional sociolinguistics, by contrast, has no assumption that the common ground in communication is pre-existing or presupposed, as Gumperz puts it:

> Linguistic and cultural boundaries are not just "naturally" there, they are communicatively and, therefore, socially constructed. Thus, they cannot be essentialized and treated as self-contained islands in research on communicative

> practices. Apart from interaction as such, ideology, power and history are all central to the way diversity works; depending on how these factors interrelate in specific circumstances, interaction can serve either to accentuate or attenuate the effects of diversity (Gumperz 2003, 111).

It is then the purpose of interactional sociolinguistic analysis to "demonstrate the sharing of inferential procedures" and to "show how diversity affects interpretation" through "ethnographically informed in-depth analysis of what transpires in an encounter" (Gumperz 1999, 459). In light of this, speaking is considered to be "a reflexive process such that everything said can be seen as either directly reacting to preceding talk, reflecting a set of immediate circumstances or responding to a past event, whether directly experienced or indirectly transmitted" (Ibid, 461).

Gumperz's program, as Bruss precisely points out, is similar to psychoanalysts utilizing strategies to "interpret and use their own seemingly unmotivated emotional responses to their patients," and as a result, the two disciplines "share the task of identifying and then analyzing types of communication which are not overtly structured in speech" (Bruss 1986, 115). In identifying such types of communication, a musical example introduced by Auer may serve as a starting point. Auer, in discussing a passage from Bach's *St. Matthew Passion*, illustrates how a switch to "straightforward, almost primitively transparent C major" has helped "steer the interpretation of linguistic signs" and "mean something different from what is said"(Auer 1992, 1-3). Such types of communication, verbal and non-verbal signals that function to convey information for people to use in continuous interpretation, have been called "contextualization cues." As such, context is no longer treated as given in interaction, but rather it is something that is construed through the inferential practices being engaged in accordance with conventions

that speakers may or may not share, or as Gumperzs puts it, through the processes of "contextualization." Furthermore, as Gumperz (1999) contends, in the process of making inference or "contexualization," constant negotiation and renegotiation of interpersonal relationships have been maintained. As Appel and Muysekn note:

> Language forms do not have a social meaning by themselves but only in so far as the participants in the interaction agree on this meaning. The latter is crucial; the social meaning of language does not depend on the speaker alone, not on the hearer alone but on an agreement, the result of negotiation as it were, between speaker and hearer (Appel and Muysekn 2006, 28).

CONCEPTUALIZING THE KEY CONCEPTS

This analysis builds upon Gumperz's interactional sociolinguistics to examine the language situation of the pan-Arab media discourse and investigate the phenomenon of code-switching between Standard Arab and different spoken vernaculars during the talk exchange. Before the data analysis, I believe it necessary to elaborate the two concepts of "diglossia" and "code-switching" to show how they relate to one another and how they can fit into the framework of interactional sociolinguisitics that focuses primarily on interaction rather than language itself.

Diglossia

The term "diglossia" was first introduced by Karl Krumbacher in 1902 in his book *Das Problem der Neugriechischen Schriftprache*. However, the commonly accepted view is that it was the French linguist William Marcais who inspired C. A. Ferguson's coinage of the term "diglossia" in his 1959 article by the same name (Zughoul 1980).

Although Ferguson cannot "copyright" the concept of diglossia himself, his groundbreaking article has marked its defining moment and is now considered the classic reference for diglossia. In this article, Ferguson examines four "defining languages" of diglossia in depth: Greek, Arabic, Swiss-German and Haitian Creole, each of which has both superposed high variety and regional low varieties. In his often-quoted passage, Ferguson defines "diglossia" as

> a relatively stable language situation in which in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature either of an earlier period or in another speech community which is learned largely by formal education and used for most written and formal spoken purposes but not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation (Ferguson 1959, 336).

As Ferguson identifies in the article, Arabic is the language that shows the major characteristic of the diglossic phenomenon: There is the Standard Arabic, or its modern variant, Modern Standard Arabic, that is the "high" (H) variety, and the colloquial Arabic that is the "low" (L) variety. Whereas the Standard Arabic is the higher language that is acquired through formal education and thus limited to the educated elites who use it in formal domains, the lower variety is used extensively in informal domains within the whole Arab society. The keynote here, is the strict separation of domains of language use. The Standard Arabic is universally used for written communication and formal spoken occasions, such as sermons in churches or mosques, university lectures, news broadcast, and political debates and speeches. The various spoken dialects, on the other hand, are used for everyday casual communication at home or on the street.

It is noteworthy here, that Ferguson has made clear in his article that diglossia refers to a situation where "two or more varieties of the same language are used by some speakers of a speech community under different conditions" (Ferguson 1959, 325), and "no attempt is made ... to examine the analogous situation where two related or unrelated languages are used side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role" (Ibid.). Yet, this definition has been misinterpreted by Joshua Fishman, who has extended the application of diglossia to societal bilingualism, saying that diglossia "was initially in connection with a society that used two (or more) languages for internal (intra-society) communication" (Fishman 1967, 29). Although comments concerning the consequences of many writers using Fishman's definition and applying diglossia to bilingualism are not relevant here, it is however necessary to pinpoint the original definition of diglossia to avoid misapplication of Ferguson's criteria.

Zughoul is one of the Arab scholars that take the classic definition of diglossia by Ferguson. He argues that the co-existence of Standard Arabic and other vernaculars in Arabic is considered a "hindrance to educational and economic development, as well as national coherence" (Zughoul 1980, 202), suggesting that "the only solution for the problem of Arabic diglossia is to reinforce the use of Classical Arabic in its Modern Standard form with linguistic reform to make the language easier to learn, easier to understand, and easier to produce" (Ibid, 213). The High-Low dichotomy of diglossia implied in Zughoul's analysis, however, is not shared by Shahir El-Hasaan, for example. As Youssef Mahmoud points out, El-Hasaan contends that "Ferguson's description of the societal alternation between the two forms of Arabic tended to be too categorical and impressionistic and had overlooked the range of sociolinguistic variation encountered in the speech of educated Arabic speakers," and that "the language situations Ferguson had cited as the exclusive domains of each language variety are not as hermetically separated

as he had thought" (Mahmoud 1986, 239). Although I believe that Ferguson's sociolinguistic framework of diglossia is valid to a large extent, I also agree with El-Hasaan's contention that Ferguson does not consider the intermediate forms of the language. Due to this shortcoming of his program, Ferguson, while stressing the linguistic dichotomy between the High variety and the Low variety, does not address the use of two codes within the same discourse in a satisfactory manner.

Code-switching

Although numerous attempts have been made to define "code-switching," a precise definition has proved to be difficult. Many have defined code-switching as the mixing of elements of two languages or two codes within the same communicative event (sf. Argenter 2001, 379; Gluth 2008, 2). This definition, however, seems rather narrow. Gumperz's broader definition of code-switching differentiates between metaphorical, or conversational, code-switching and situational code-switching. According to him, conversational code-switching is defined as the "juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems" (Gumperz 1982, 59). While this notion of conversational code-switching overlaps with the commonly used definition of code-switching, Gumperz has also identified situational code-switching, where the change of codes is triggered by the change of situation. As Gumperz himself puts it, situational code-switching refers to the change of language where "[d]istinct varieties are employed in certain settings (such as home, school, work) that are associated with separate, bounded kinds of activities (public speaking, formal negotiations, special ceremonials, verbal games, etc.) or spoken with

different categories of speakers (friends, family members, strangers, social inferiors, government officials, etc." (Ibid, 60).

It is not hard to realize that what Gumperz calls situational code-switching is of the diglossia-type, where code alternation is quite stable, and only occurs when situations or norms are changing. Thus, Gumperz's coinage of situational code-switching certainly champions Ferguson's framework of diglossia. However, in his interactional sociolinguistic perspective, Gumperz is interested in the conversational, or metaphorical, code-switching rather than the diglossia-type situational code-switching. Gumperz has observed that while social setting remains the same, some speakers still switch from one code to another. For example, in a study undertaken in the Norwegian village of Hemnesberget, Blom and Gumperz (1972) find that a local resident approaches a clerk's desk, and extends greetings and asks about family affairs using Ranamal, the local variety of Norwegian, but uses Bokmal, the standard Norwegian variety when doing the official business. Gumperz points out that "an individual's choice of speech style has symbolic value and interpretive consequences that cannot be explained simply by correlating the incidence of linguistic variants with independently determined social and contextual categories (Gumperz 1982, vii). Gumperz elaborates this phenomenon of code-switching by making the distinction between the "we code" and the "they code," stating that:

> The tendency is for the ethnically specific, minority language to be regarded as the "we code" and becomes associated with in-group and informal activities, and for the majority language to serve as the "they code" associated with the more formal, stiffer and less personal out-group relations (Gumperz 1982, 66).

This understanding of conversational code-switching is very important, because the "we" and "they" dichotomy serves to symbolize the interrelationships of language

users, rather than merely reflect the social norms, as proposed by Ferguson. As Gumperz argues, "rather than claiming that speakers use language in response to a fixed, predetermined set of prescriptions, it seems more reasonable to assume that they build on their own and their audience's abstract understanding of situational norms, to communicate metaphoric information about how they intend their words to be understood" (Ibid, 61). Gumperz enumerates six specific conversational functions of code-switching: Quotations; Addressee specification; Interjections; Reiteration; Message qualification; Personalization versus objectivization (Ibid, 75-80).

Peter Auer is another influential contributor to the theories in the sociolinguistic branch of code-switching studies. He agrees with Gumperz that context is not something that is given, but rather, it is constructed through continuous interactions among participants. Thus, Auer is in line with Gumperz in suggesting that the notion of contextualization is most promising in building a model to account for conversational code-switching. However, Auer is dissatisfied with Gumperz's listing functions of code-switching, maintaining that it is impossible to summarize a set of categories of functions of code-switching because the functions of code-switching are virtually open-ended and indefinite, and that it is more fruitful to focus on analyzing how code-switching functions as what is described by Gumperz as a "contextualization cue." As he writes, "There is a certain danger for the pendulum to swing too far ... i.e., to treat each and every instance of language alternation as meaningful in the same 'semantic' way" (Auer 1984, 105). Still, Auer sees the interactional meaningfulness of code-switching as "creat[ing] interactional and rhetorical effects, just as contrasts in loudness, pace, and pitch do" (Woolard 2006, 79).

Howard Giles is also a prominent researcher who has made important contributions to the understanding of social meaning of code-switching. Under his

theoretical framework of speech accommodation theory, later revitalized as communication accommodation theory, Giles tries to "explain some of the motivations underlying certain shifts in people's speech styles during social encounters and some of the social consequences arising from them" (Beebe & Giles 1984, 7). According to Giles' theory, participants during social interaction "are motivated to adjust (or accommodate) their speech styles as a means of evoking listeners' social approval, attaining communicational efficiency between interactants, and maintaining positive social identities" (ibid). This strategy is termed "speech convergence." By contrast, there also exists "speech divergence," by which speakers "accentuate vocal differences between themselves and others" (ibid). Speakers' linguistic choices and listeners' perception of and reaction to these choices are thus central to Giles' program. Giles and his associates' work on accommodation theory is highly relevant to understanding the social motivations for code-switching. For example, Giles, Taylor and Bourhis (1973) have studied code-switching by examining eighty bilingual Canadians in the bilingual city of Montreal. It was found that Anglophone students were more likely to switch to French, which is their weaker language, with their Francophone interlocutors when the latter converged to English, which is the latter's weaker language. This has shown that interlocutors accommodate mutually to each other's code choice to promote interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, Bourhis and Giles (1977) have also conducted an experiment to demonstrate that Welsh people tend to use accent divergence when their feeling of ethnic identity is threatened. According to Giles et al. (1987), interactants may diverge in order to (1) maintain a positive in-group identity, (2) dissociate themselves socially from a partner, (2) render a partner less powerful, or (3) entice an interlocutor to adopt a different speech behavior.

Last but by no means least, is Carol Myers-Scotton. Further elaborating the functional approach to code-switching, Myers-Scotton has devised the markedness model (MM) to account for speakers' socio-psychological motivation of code-switching between languages. Recognizing the limits of variable-based analysis, Myers-Scotton in her theory suggests that even though most choices reflect larger societal background, speakers are creative and rational actors "in the sense that, at some level of consciousness, they are making choices that do not simply reflect their social group memberships or the type of speech event in which they are participating or the structure of the event" (Myers-Scotton 1998, 19). Myers-Scotton believes that each linguistic variety used in code-switching has social associations, and speakers' exploiting the possibility of making code choices from their linguistic repertoire is indexical of a specific kind of interrelationship, including speakers' attitudes to and expectations from each other, or the so-called "rights-and-obligations set" (RO set), that is in force during the exchange.

Myers-Scotton sees code-switching as a principle-governed phenomenon. According to her, "[t]hese principles hold that choices in specific interactions are best explained as cognitively based calculations that depend on the actor's estimation of what actions offer him/her the greatest utility" (Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001, 2). Myers-Scotton proposes four principles of code-switching:

1. Sequential unmarked code-switching. "When on or more of the situational factorschange within the course of a conversation, the unmarked RO set may change.... Whenever the unmarked RO set is altered by such factors, the speaker will switch codes if he or she wishes to index the new unmarked RO set" (Myers-Scotton 1993, 114).

2. Code-switching as the unmarked norm. “Speaking two languages in the same conversation [as the unmarked norm between bilingual peers] ... each switch ... does not necessarily have a special indexicality; rather, it is the overall pattern which carries the communicative force” (Ibid, 117).
3. Code-switching as a marked choice. “A marked choice derives its meaning from two sources: first, since it is not the unmarked choice, it is a negotiation against the unmarked RO set; and second, as ‘something else,’ the marked choice is a call for another RO set in its place, that for which the speaker’s choice is the unmarked index” (Ibid, 131).
4. Code-switching as an exploratory choice. “When an unmarked choice is not clear, [speakers] use code-switching to make alternate exploratory choices as candidates for an unmarked choice and thereby as an index of an RO set which [they] favor” (Ibid, 142).

The markedness model follows directly on from Giles’ speech accommodation theory that explains code-switching as strategic and goal-oriented. For Myers-Scotton, the goal of speakers is “to enhance rewards and minimize costs” or “to optimize” (Myers-Scotton 1998, 19). That is to say, sometimes speakers prefer one variety to another when expressing the same idea because they expect certain benefits from that choice relative to the costs. For example, for Arabs the preferred variety in family environments is a colloquial vernacular. However, if in educational or professional contexts, colloquial vernaculars are standing out from the immediate context and as a result, are viewed as disadvantaged. Comparatively, Standard Arabic in local settings is viewed as “standing-out,” but is preferred in formal contexts. Yet, for Myers-Scotton, this goal-oriented code choice does not necessarily mean that this switching has a social motivation. Myers-Scotton differentiates between the unmarked choice and the marked choice. In any given

interaction speakers will infer the unmarked RO set from the context and switch codes to comply with the unmarked RO set of the relevant interaction type. In other words, speakers use the unmarked code-switching strategy because it is just the casual way of speaking for them. When the context changes, the speakers will change code, as a normative code choice, to conform to the expected RO set in the new context. By contrast, speakers also use the possibility of making code choice to "negotiate a change in the expected social distance holding between participants, either increasing it or decreasing it" (Myers-Scotton 1993, 132). This non-typical, unexpected code-switching is "marked."

Methodology

The main topic of this study is the analysis of code-switching in the pan-Arab media discourse. Although Ferguson's proposal of diglossia posits pan-Arab media as the domain of Standard Arabic, code-switching does occur from time to time in the pan-Arab media discourse. Thus, the central question this study asks is: Under what conditions does code-switching happen in the pan-Arab media discourse? Further, the question is: What theories best account for code-switching? The applicability of relevant theories proposed by Gumperz, Giles, and Myers-Scotton that attempt to explain the discourse functions and motivations for code switching will be determined.

THE CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

An analysis of the Arab media discourse from a sociolinguistic perspective is not possible without reference to the social agents that have created and transformed it. In order to truly understand the discourse, it is necessary to situate it in the sociocultural context. When examining this context, several scholars have provided ingenious insights into the issue. Lynch rightly argues, "where Arab public life had for decades been dominated by the voice of the state, al-Jazeera ushered in a new kind of open, contentious public politics in which a plethora of competing voices clamored for attention" (Lynch 2006, 2). Rinnawi (2006) has a similar contention. He argues that the emergence of Arab transnational media represented by al-Jazeera and other new satellite television stations has eroded the relatively rigid media structure existing in the Arab world for more than forty years. Rinnawi further argues that a shared sense of Arab nationalism has been created as a result of the flourish of transnational media in the Arab world, ranging from Saudi Arabia in the East to Morocco in the West. He uses the word McArabism to refer

to the situation in which the citizens throughout the Arab world receive identical pan-Arab content via transnational media and thus place all the issues into an Arab narrative. As Rinnawi argues, McArabism emerges from "indigenous mechanism" through which transnational media push for freedom to select contents in order to attract the largest audience possible rather than from any progressive pan-Arab policies.

Both Lynch and Rinnawi have recognized the impact of Arabic language satellite television stations on the flow of information in the region and the cultivation of Arab public as a result. Yet this is not the first time that the Arab media have taken advantage of a crucial moment in the history of transnational broadcasting to shape a pan-Arab agenda. Recall *The Voice of the Arabs*, Egypt's radio service in the 1950s and 1960s, when the radios acquired by the illiterate poor across the Arab world helped *The Voice of the Arabs* gain instant popularity throughout the region and create huge potential to challenge the legitimacy of the newly established Arab states. As *The Voice of the Arabs* reached across national borders and blended domestic and regional issues, a sense of national identity was claimed to be created in the general context of anti-colonialism and socialism agenda in the Third World.

Reviewing this period of history and comparing it with the era of the Arab transnational media based on satellite television, Internet and other new technologies, however, depict much more differences than similarities between the two slices in the history of transnational broadcasting. The first time that the Arab nationalist rhetoric was reached was in July 1954, when Gamal Abdul Nasser, who adopted leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, declared on the second anniversary of the revolution that "the goal of the government of the revolution is that the Arabs become a united nation" (Jankowski 2001, 32). In this context, *The Voice of the Arabs* became Egyptian propaganda instrument emphasizing the theme that the Arab unity was the path of

realizing victory. In contrast to *The Voice of the Arabs*, Qatar's al-Jazeera by no means implies the peninsular emirate's aspirations to Arab leadership, although al-Jazeera has given Qatar more leverage politically and regionally. In this vein, a critical difference can be argued: When Gamal Abdul Nasser launched *The Voice of the Arabs*, his belief was that the media mediated in a top-down fashion and could be utilized as an instrument of anti-imperialism; Al-Jazeera, on the contrary, was launched in the hope that bottom-up media could play their role in the social development and in this case, in the realization of a pan-Arab ideology.

This difference has crucial implications for the interactional sociolinguistic analysis of Arab media discourse. As Gumperz asserts, "Communication is a social activity requiring the coordinated efforts of two or more individuals. Mere talk to produce sentences, no matter how well formed or elegant the outcome, does not by itself constitute communication. Only when a move has elicited a response can we say communication is taking place" (Gumperz 1982, 1). Given Gumperz's strict definition of communication, we can examine *The Voice of the Arabs* in a different fashion, thus enabling us to reflect the new Arab public sphere represented by al-Jazeera from a different perspective. Although in the retrospect many would recall the Arab diva Umm Kalthoum and connect her legendary "voice of the Arabs" to *The Voice of the Arabs* as her music was often being used on this Egyptian radio to attract audiences throughout the region, the speeches on the radio, which can be categorized as "mere talk to produce sentences," still suffered a loss of credibility after the defeat of Egypt in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As Jacoby notes, Arab defeat in the 1967 War soon "destroyed the credibility of those Arab leaders who claimed patronage over the Palestinian cause, particularly Egypt's President Gamam Abdel Nasser" and "caused a transition of power in the Arab world that paved the way for the emergence of the Palestinians as an independent factor

in the Arab-Israeli Conflict" (Jacoby 2007, 17). Thus, the question to what extent the Arab audience was mobilized by *The Voice of the Arabs* to support the pan-Arab nationalism championed by Nasser still remains unanswered. Al-Jazeera, which is represented by its flagship program *The Opposite Direction*, on the other hand, has provided platforms for individuals to engage themselves in arenas that "require the coordinated efforts of two or more individuals." This understanding is critical to the analysis, because only when genuine communication is in existence, is the bottom-up interactional sociolinguistic approach meaningful.

WHY STUDYING AL-JAZEERA'S *THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION*

Although many Arab critics, along with their Western counterparts, have criticized that contemporary Arab political discourse suffers from a lack of rationality and serious scholarly credibility (Ajami 1999; Makiya 1998), the significance of pan-Arab media cannot be denied. Take, al-Jazeera's *The Opposite Direction* for example, it is true that many of the guests have excessive and single-minded zeal, especially for an extreme religious or political cause. It is true that many, if not most, of the guests attending the program would wave their hands in the air while they debate fiercely and relentlessly, their voices trembling with outrage and fury. However, it is also true that Arabs are creating a culture of dialogue and communication in the context of pan-Arab communications integration.

Since pan-Arab media is the central subject of this study, I find it necessary to locate a proxy for it and I have decided to use al-Jazeera and specifically, its flagship talk show *The Opposite Direction* as a vehicle for depicting the pan-Arab media discourse. This is not a random procedure. According to a poll conducted by Zogby International

and the University of Maryland in May 2004, al-Jazeera is the first choice for 62 percent of satellite news viewers in Jordan, 66 percent in Egypt and 44 percent in Saudi Arabia (Shapiro 2005, 28). One could argue that al-Jazeera is perhaps the most watched and most credible Arab satellite television. As for *The Opposite Direction*, a live program where two guests with contrary views argue with one another with al-Qasim moderating as the host, is "undoubted the most popular and most controversial political talk show in the history of Arab television" (Bahry 2001, 92).

Many viewers would feel a hint of a thrill at the show's opening credits, for the dazzling montage of different guests waiving their hands and pointing their fingers while they argue heatedly. Their voice is muted, and the background is filled with powerful and fast-paced music that seems to be intended to convey a sense of urgency. Immediately upon a fade-out of music, al-Qasim sits calmly along with his guests in front of the camera and begins posing his opening questions after greeting the audience briefly.

His framing of the arguments to come is striking and unique: Not only are the questions in an extremely elaborate and elegant manner, reflecting the exceptionally rich rhetorical tradition of Arabic, more important is the fact that al-Qasim would frame the argument from two exactly opposite points of view. As Lynch argues, "such open arguments over the most sensitive issues, involving strong representatives of both sides of the dispute, represent the hallmark of al-Jazeera's approach to Arab politics" (Lynch 2006, 2).

DATA COLLECTION

I draw on a set of 464 episodes of *The Opposite Direction* aired on al-Jazeera between January 1998 and December 2007. I browse the official transcript available at

www.aljazeera.net and translate the title of each episode into English. A list of episode titles with the original air dates is provided in Appendix A. The purpose is to gain a general understanding of what is discussed on *The Opposite Direction*. From the large pool of data available, I have arbitrarily chosen for analysis four episodes that vary in content. However, the selection process is not random, for each episode has been chosen for certain reasons.

The first episode, titled "a clash of civilization," is chosen because there is a heavily edited video clip of this episode available online, in which one of the two guests, Wafa Sultan, a secular psychologist of Syrian-American origin is dominating the show, criticizing brutality of Islam and Islamic terrorism, while the other guest, Ibrahim al-Khuli, Professor of Islamic Studies in al-Azhar University, is barely shown speaking at all. My original interest in this episode stems from my intention to reveal a neutral and objective look of the program. The second episode, titled "women's issue in the Arab world," is chosen specifically because of Nawal al-Saʿdawi, for she is the first Arab woman to write about the politics of sex, and is a prime example of feminist activists that challenge the traditional values of Islam. The third episode, tackling the issue of Sudanese identity, is chosen because Sudan occupies a unique position spanning the Arab world and that of other cultures, making the issue of identity very much controversial for Sudanese people. The last episode, discussing the issue of media freedom, has been chosen because it is the first time in history that a U. S. official who has mastered Arabic appear in front of Arab audience speaking Arabic. Admittedly, the fact that I resort to subjectively selecting issues to tackle in this paper may to a large extent hinder the representativeness of the selected samples, it is still hoped that this paper can shed some light on a better understanding of Arab political discourse.

Data Analysis

For each episode being analyzed, I first translate the opening questions posed by the host Faisal al-Qasim, because these provocative questions that reflect dissenting views provide a general framework for the heated discussion to come and is thus essential for understanding what gets discussed in the program. The English translation is presented in Appendix B. Then, I choose to analyze one or two instances of code-switching in each episode in detail. In choosing theses instances of code-switching, I am not only aware that language is layered level upon level, but also mindful that language is a cyclical matter and we can start the cycle anywhere. As a result, while I strive to provide enough background information to facilitate a better understanding of the context, I do not hesitate to analyze the phenomenon of code-switching that occurs in the middle of a conversation. Using the audio recordings available online, I try to transcribe Arabic directly as it is pronounced to keep the flavor of a real conversation. My transliteration of Arabic follows the system that the Library of Congress recommends, namely, the ALA-LC transliteration system. Passages in non-standard Arabic dialects are italicized, whereas passages in Standard Arabic are not. Each passage is followed by an English translation in parentheses.

EXAMPLE ONE

This episode features Wafa Sultan, a critic of Islam and Ibrahim al-Khuli, a religious professor, and was aired on February 21, 2006. In this episode the speakers debate on the sensitive and controversial issue of the clash of civilizations facing the Arabs in the contemporary world. The point of the debate is to depict the Western

perceptions as well as the Arab views toward the "clash of civilizations" theory in general and the concept of "clash of religions" in particular.

After al-Qasim starts the show by posing a series of questions, the two guests begin to argue about the definitions of culture, civilization, and religion. Wafa Sultan's statement that she understands from Ibrahim al-Khuli that civilization means human beings immediately provokes a storm of protest from al-Khuli, as he at once gives a roar of rage saying: "Not true." While Sultan tries to ignore al-Khuli and continues her argument, al-Khuli, angered by Sultan's distorting his opinion, keeps shouting and interrupting Sultan.

(1.1) Wafa Sultan: Fahimtu min hādhā l-kalām anna l-haḍārah bi-raʾyi l-ustādh Ibrahīm hiya l-insān… (I understood from these words that civilization in Professor Ibrahim's opinion means human beings…)

(1.2) Ibrahim al-Khuli (Interrupting): Laysa ṣaḥīhan… (Not true…)

(1.3) Wafa Sultan: Muqāranah basiṭah bayna… (A simple comparison between…)

(1.4) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Lam aqul hādhā… (I did not say this…)

(1.5) Wafa Sultan: al-Mujtamaʿāti l-Islāmiyah… (Islamic societies…)

(1.6) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Laysa hādhā ma qultuhu… (This is not what I said…)

(1.7) Wafa Sultan: huwa qāla inna… (He said that…)

Here al-Khuli is expressing his feeling of annoyance and the message being conveyed is quite personal rather than formal. He uses first person pronouns several times, and his speaking rate, with which one utterance succeeds another, is rather fast. Yet, al-Khuli is still capable of speaking in Standard Arabic. A good example is utterance (1.2), in which al-Khuli uses a Standard Arabic negative construction, complete with

correct case-making. Certainly, al-Khuli's awareness of his own social characteristics affecting language use is a necessary starting point, but it is argued here that al-Khuli, in his own interpretation and negotiation process, opts to use what Gumperz terms as the "they" code. That is to say, al-Khuli is not obliged to use the "they" code in this specific setting, because the message he means to convey is rather personal. But he willingly chooses to do so. A plausible explanation of this fact is that al-Khuli is accommodating his interlocutors. He is saving al-Qasim's face, if not Sultan's.

Faisal al-Qasim, on the other hand, does not hesitate to use the Levantine dialect as he tries to control the discussion and allows Sultan a chance to finish her argument.

(1.8) Faisal al-Qasim: *Bas* daqīqah, tafaḍḍali. (*But* a minute (to Ibrahim al-Khuli), please (to Dr. Wafa).)

Here the shift in code is not marked in the sense that it represents what people may have actually said, and the two words *bas* and *daqiqah* assimilate phonetically and rhythmically to form one message, so that the total conversational effect is that of an utterance spoken in one single language variety. Thus, we find ourselves in a paradox: On the one hand, if we analyze this code-switching under the framework of Myers-Scotton's markedness model and refer to the code-switching as an "unconscious" lapse of attention, we are tempted to interpret it as what Myers-Scotton describes as "code-switching as the unmarked norm," with no particular discourse function or communicative effect being realized. In other words, if the speaker al-Qasim is not aware of his own usage of code-switching, it is impossible for him to assign any function to this conversational switching; on the other hand, however, if we follow Gumperz's approach, we see clearly that the code-switching in conversation is always purposeful as a discourse-related cue, and whether or not it is "conscious" is beside the point.

In this example, one of the functions this code-switching performs is to mark an interjection that is more accessible to the audience. If al-Qasim chooses not to use spoken Levantine Arabic but Standard Arabic, a correct way to say "wait a moment" would be "Intaẓir qalīlan." It is clear that the colloquial expression is more accessible and much easier to pronounce. Another function is for addressee specification, that is, to single out al-Khuli as the particular addressee. Moreover, it can be argued that the code-switching here has a "personalization" function. Gumperz (1982) has specified that the code contrast could relate to the degree of speaker involvement in a message, to whether a statement reflects personal opinion or knowledge, or to whether it indicates the authority of generally known fact. In this example, it can be argued that al-Qasim's using code-switching to interrupt al-Khuli's talk demonstrates his high level of personal involvement in the discussion, his strong personal annoyance with al-Khuli's unprofessional behavior, as well as his emphasis on his authority as the moderator. In this way, certain goals have been achieved and al-Qasim himself may or may not be aware as the speaker.

Ibrahim al-Khuli, right upon his receiving the message, signals his understanding of al-Qasim's main aim and gives an obvious negative response as he immediately changes his addressee to al-Qasim, saying:

(1.9) Ibrahim al-Khuli: Lā... Lā tuḥammiluni ma lam aqul… (No… Don't impose on me what I didn't say…)

EXAMPLE TWO

This episode was aired on May 5th, 1998. The speakers are Yusuf al-Badri, member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and Nawal al-Saʿdawi, a famous Egyptian feminist writer, activist and physician. During this episode, the speakers debate on Arab women's intellectual equality and biological inferiority, on present social and

political situation of Arab women, on religious and traditional shackles on Arab women, among other related topics. As usual, Faisal al-Qasim frames the show by posing to the audience a series of questions about Arabs' failure to protect women's right, about the dimensions of the issue of the human rights of women, and about the failure of the Arab women's movements. Then al-Qasim starts the discussion by asking al-Saʿdawi to describe the situation of Arab women, and the following is Saʿdawi's response:

> (2.1) Waḍʿ l-marʾah l-ʿArabīyah lā yumkin an yufham illā bi-rabṭiha bi-l-qaḍiyah l-siyāsīyah l-ʿālamīyah wa-l-ʿArabīyah wa-l-mushkilah l-usarīyah yaʿnī hākadhā tanawuli li-qaḍiyat al-marʾah fa-kayfa atakallam ʿani l-marʾah bi-dūn an atanāwal al-iqtiṣād aw al-siyāsah aw al-ḥarb aw al-silm? kul *dah* murtabiṭ bi-baʿḍihi fa-anta *bi-tasʾalni* ʿan mushkilat al-waṭan al-ʿArabi kulluh wa-laysa faqaṭ mushkilat niṣfi *l-muqtamaʿ* li-anna l-nisāʾ hunna niṣf *l-muqtamaʿ*, ayyi intikās iqtiṣādī ayyi istiʿmār ayyi istighlāl yanʿakis ʿalā *l-riqāl* wa-l-nisāʾ *zay baʿḍ* fa-idhan hiya al-qaḍīyah… qaḍīyat l-waṭan *dilwaʾtī*… (The situation of Arab women cannot be understood except by linking it to the global and Arab political issue and family problem. Well... Thus, to address the issue of women... How can I speak of women without addressing the economy or politics or war or peace? *They are* related to each other. So *you are asking me* about the problem of the whole Arab nation and not just the problem of one-half of *society*, because women are one-half of *society*. *Men* and women are reflected in economic recession, in colonization, and in exploitation, *and so on and so forth*. Then, it is the issue… the issue of the nation-state *now*…)

In this passage, al-Saʿdawi begins with Standard Arabic, albeit with no explicit case-making, to state the necessity to consider economic and political factors when

talking about the situation of Arab women. As she continues, her sentences gradually become fairly colloquial in form, spoken in a fast tempo, with the code shifting more towards Egyptian colloquial Arabic. She consistently uses Egyptian colloquial phonemes like *q* instead of the Standard Arabic *j*. This is in sharp contrast with al-Qasim's using highly marked Standard Arabic feature in his opening verse, pronouncing mood and case endings in each instance.

Here al-Saʿdawi's use of colloquial Arabic is rather striking. As is expected from a formal situation of this kind, al-Saʿdawi should share knowledge about the basic purpose of the interaction and be socially conscious to use Standard Arabic rather than Egyptian dialect to match herself to this particular situation she is in. One might argue that the fact that al-Saʿdawi starts out speaking a form of Standard Arabic but gradually drifts into a form of Arabic more obviously like Egyptian vernacular indicates her lack of linguistic competence and inability to maintain the flow of speech using Standard Arabic. I cannot agree, for al-Saʿdawi herself is a very important player on the contemporary Arab intellectual scene, one of the most prolific feminist writers in twentieth-century Arab countries, and boasts an enormous readership both inside and outside the Arab world. She is known for both of her novels and her essays on Arab society, both written first in her native Arabic. For an intellectual elite like al-Saʿdawi, a perfect command of Standard Arabic is essential. Thus, using Standard Arabic in formal domain should not be a problem to her.

We should therefore assume that the speaker is manipulating language to realize some communicative functions of code-switching, as Gumperz (1982) suggests. Although Gumperz has rightly pointed that an individual plays the major role in code-switching, the several functions of code-switching he identifies seem to have limited relevance here. Al-Saʿdawi's code-switched passage does not have a quotation, nor does

it serve to direct the message specifically to one of the other two interlocutors, because both of al-Qasim and al-Badri speak Standard Arabic. No reiteration is found in the passage. The main message is conveyed in both Standard Arabic and Egyptian dialect, and neither language variety is used to qualify the message. In addition, although al-Saʿdawi uses first person singular pronouns, the message in this passage is far from personal, and the shift from Standard Arabic to Egyptian dialect does not correspond to a change from objective factuality to personalized statement. The only thing that can be said about this code-switched passage is that the code-switching serves to mark an interjection or sentence filler. Yet, "interjection" and "sentence filler" per se are merely names for linguistic structures; their functions are another issue that remains unaddressed.

If we look at this code-switched passage from Myers-Scotton's perspective, we can argue that the code-switching is a marked choice not only because it is used in a formal context, in which communication is established with non in-group members and formal Arabic is conventionally expected, but also because al-Saʿdawi should have a priori knowledge of which code choice is appropriate in the setting. If not, she should become aware of this conventional expectation as her interlocutors constantly remind her that they wish to be addressed in Standard Arabic. They accomplish this by resorting to an implicit strategy, namely, using the language of choice and pronouncing correct mood and case endings. See Faisal al-Qasim's response to al-Saʿdawi as follows:

> (2.2) Faḍīlatu s-shaykh, hal yumukin an nulakhkhiṣa al-ʿamalīyah bi-akmalihā bi-annahā dhāt abʿād siyāsīyah wa-qtiṣadīyah bahtah? (Sheikh (al-Badri), can we sum up that the process as a whole has political and economic dimensions?)

Seeing that al-Saʿdawi does not conform to Standard Arabic, we can argue that al-Saʿdawi is trying to negotiate a new balance in the relationship with the other two interlocutors. That is to say, by switching from Standard Arabic to Egyptian Arabic, al-Saʿdawi is intended to convey to her addressees this message: "Put aside any presumptions you have based on societal norms for these circumstances. I want your view of me, or of our relationship, to be otherwise" (Myers-Scotton 1993, 131). As such, we may assume that al-Saʿdawi is asserting some role in the process. As Myers-Scotton argues, "A major motivation for variety in linguistic choices in a given community is the possibility of social identity negotiations" (Ibid, 111). Then, the questions are: What identity does al-Saʿdawi want to reinforce? Why does al-Saʿdawi want to emphasize this social identity?

The first question is not hard to answer, for the Egyptian dialect is undoubtedly an important component of the Egyptian identity. The second question is rather complicated. One relatively simple answer is that al-Saʿdawi is safeguarding the linguistic heritage of the Egyptian dialect. Indeed, of all Arab countries, Egypt is the one with the most prominent tendency towards the use of the dialect. As Haeri notes, although generally considered to be nonstandard, some primary dialects, including the Egyptian dialect, "belong to important urban centers" and "represent a sort of urban standard variety that has prestige and that those outside of such centers must learn for purposes of communication and assimilation" (Haeri 2000, 65). That is to say, perhaps in al-Saʿdawi's opinion, the Egyptian dialect is the "standard" language variety that carries prestige, in comparison with Standard Arabic. We may further explain that al-Saʿdawi, by manipulating linguistic variation and constructing an image of the Egyptian identity, is attempting to reach out to and represent some specific group of people. In my opinion, this group could be literate Arab females. Although they understand the higher level of

Standard Arabic, they for the most part have a favorable attitude towards the colloquial language. As a result, al-Saʿdawi, in a culturally intimate way, becomes the voice of the Arab women, expressing their ideas in their own language.

Giles' accommodation theory may also shed some light on the analysis of al-Saʿdawi's engaging in code-switching. Al-Saʿdawi could have used the "right" language to get the job done without stirring up a conflict, but she opts for the opposite: Rather than neutralizing underlying conflict and accommodating her interlocutors, al-Saʿdawi chooses to diverge linguistically from her interlocutors through choice of code. It is obvious that al-Saʿdawi strives to maintain a positive in-group identity and distance herself from her interlocutors in order to represent certain group of people, as I have previously suggested. Another proposed motivation is to render her partners less powerful. That is to say, code switches are used here to convey authority, to "cripple" the ability of outsiders to interact efficiently and effectively, if enticing an interlocutor to adopt a this communicative style is not possible. According to Giles, there is still an important motivation for choosing a linguistic strategy, that is, to signal dislike or disapproval of the other interlocutors. This motivation becomes more obvious after al-Saʿdawi is continually interrupted by al-Badri, as she complains:

> (2.3) Ṭayyib, ana *dilwaʾtī iḥnā*… anta dakhalta fi l-khalāyā *wa-ma aʿṭatnish* furṣah yaʿnī… ana darast al-khalāyā yaʿni daʿnī atakallam… (Fine, *right now let's*… if you enter into a cell… *and he didn't give me* chance well… I have studied the cell, well, let me speak…)

Here Al-Saʿdawi switches to Egyptian dialect to emphasize her annoyance at not being given a chance to speak, and this personal feeling of anger is well expressed using the dialect.

EXAMPLE THREE

This episode, which was aired on January 23, 2007, deals with the identity of Sudan. The two guests participating in the debate are respectively AbuBakr al-Qadi, Chairman of the General Congress for the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement, a rebel group involved in the Darfur conflict of Sudan and Sayf al-Din al-Bashir, Editor-in-Chief of Sudan Vision, a pro-Sudanese government newspaper. The main issues about which the whole debate revolves are the conspiracy against the Arab and Islamic identity, the conflict between the dominant culture and minority culture, as well as the clash of cultures and national fragmentation in Sudan.

In the opening questions posed to the audience, al-Qasim first condemns the conspiracies against Sudan's Arab-Islamic identity. Then, he takes a 180-degree turn and begins to point out that Sudan has the most acute crisis of national identity and the Arabs are the minority. After presenting both sides of the dispute, al-Qasim directs the first question to AbuBakr al-Qadi, asking him whether there is a conspiracy to obliterate Sudan's Arab identity. In his response, al-Qasi voices his opinion that it is the Arab government's own mistake that strangles the settlement of Darfur issue. He says:

> Bismillāhi r-Raḥmāni r-Raḥīm anta taʿrifu naẓarīyata l-muʾāmarah l-ʿArabīyah. Ana… idhā kān fī ayyi jihah fī l-ʿālam tataʾāmaru ʿalā s-Sudān hādhā shaʾnuha. Lākin ana aqūl ma yajrī fī s-Sudān huwa min kasbi aydinā wa-min akhṭāʾina nahnu, as-Sudān idhā kān yaʿnī fīhi ḥushūd ḥawla Tshād aw fī Afrīqiyā l-wasṭā aw fī quwwatin umamīyah hādhā bi-sabab akhṭaʾinā nahnu. *Iḥnā* khalaqnā mushkilat al-janūb *iḥnā* l-ḥukūmah wa-aʿnī kulla l-ḥukūmāt bi-ma fihā al-inqādh min sanah 1956 ilā yawminā hādhā. Akhṭāʾunā hiya l-lati jalabat ilaynā ẓ-ẓurūf *illī* nahnu fihā saqaṭati l-bawābāt fī l-ʿIraq bi-sabab akhṭāʾi n-niẓām niẓām

Ṣadām Ḥusayn l-bāʾid wa-n-niẓām fī s-Sudān ṣaḥīḥ yaʿnī al-janūb ʿarḍah li-linfiṣal bi-sabab akhṭāʾinā nahnu wa-siyāsātinā nahnu. Al-Janūbiīn ṭalaba fī sanah 1956 muṭālib basīṭah jiddan hiya l-fadrālīyah wa-rafadnā fī muʾtamar l-māʾidah l-mustadīrah kullu aḥzabina rafaḍat hādhā l-kalām wa-fī n-nihāyah kharaja l-Janūbiīn wa-tabaddalati l-qiyādat wa-jāʾat qiyādah ṭalabat fī n-nihāyah taqrīr l-maṣīr *iḥnā* fī Dārfūr anta taqūl al-waḍʿ khaṭīr fī Dārfūr *iḥnā* shaʿb Dārfūr Muslim wa-yuḥibbu l-waḥdah akhshi an tatakarrara l-tajribah l-ʾān l-ḥāṣilah fī l-janūb *iḥnā* l-ʾān nuṭālib bi-muṭālib basīṭah jiddan… (In the name of Allah. You know the Arab conspiracy theories. If anyone in the world conspires against Sudan, this is his issue. But I say that what is happening in Sudan is due to our own mistakes. The fact that the troops or international forces are in Chad or in central Africa is because of our own mistakes. *We* created the problem of the South, it is because of our government, and I mean all the governments since the rescue of Sudan in 1956 to our day. *We* are in such circumstances because of our own mistakes. The gates in Iraq fell due to the mistakes of Saddam Hussein's deposed regime. And speaking to the regime in Sudan, it is right to say that the South is prone to separation because of our own mistakes and our own policies. The Southerners had a very simple demand in 1956 - the demand for federalism. All of our parties rejected this demand in the round table conference and in the end the leadership changed and the Southerners demanded self-determination. You say that the situation in Darfur is dangerous. *We* Darfurians are Muslims and we embrace unity and now we have a very simple demand…)

Here central to our analysis is what cultural identity and group membership al-Qadi is intended to construct. To start with, we must acknowledge the fact that al-Qadi's

social identity has multiple dimensions. On the one hand, he is a Muslim. This can be suggested from the fact that al-Qadi starts his turn with "in the name of Allah," or the "basmala," which has a special significance for Muslims and is used by them in a number of contexts. For pious Muslims, basmala is so important that they rarely begin any activity without first reciting the verse. On the other hand, al-Qadi also represents an anti-government group in Sudan. Because the government in Khartoum has the Arab-Islamic identity, being anti-government may be seen as being ant-Arab and anti-Muslim. This is particularly true if we consider that the program is aimed at a pan-Arab audience that has a shared stance on pan-Arab and Islamic issues. One of al-Qasim's opening questions may reflect this audience perception, as he asks: "How are those Sudanese that doubt about the Arab identity of Sudan different from those Iraqis that came at the back of the American tanks and devoted all their efforts to depriving Iraq of its Arab identity?" As a result, we see in al-Qadi multiple and conflicting identity elements: He is a Muslim that is anti-Muslim.

However, following Gumperz's approach, I argue that al-Qadi is not in a position that he can do nothing but accepting his conflicting identity. Rather, I argue that by manipulating language al-Qadi has the ability to mark a change in the role his is playing, or he is perceived as playing. That is to say, al-Qadi may decide to play on the Muslim element of his identity, or he may decide to play on the anti-government element of his identity. He chooses to do so in different situations to convey different messages. In this passage, it can be argued that the role that al-Qadi assigns to himself is that of a Muslim as a Muslim, not as a member of an anti-government group. To start with, al-Qasi uses first person plural pronoun twice stressing that what happens in Sudan is due to "our" mistake. Without making specific reference, al-Qadi offers himself an opportunity for ambiguous identity, a chance for him to be perceived as an in-group member by his Arab

audience, with no regard to his political affiliations. His use of independent pronoun *nahnu* in addition to the suffix pronoun has a particularly striking effect. This independent pronoun could be omitted without affecting the grammatical correctness of the sentence; however, the emphasis on the subject would be substantially reduced without this written Arabic phraseology. To further project his Arab-Muslim identity and emphasize it, al-Qadi exploits the local dialect and uses *ihna* to underscore his personal involvement and emotional communication. Recall Myers-Scotton's argument that speakers as rational actors make code choices to enhance rewards and minimize costs. In this passage, al-Qadi's switch from Standard Arabic to colloquial Arabic has marked a powerful feature of language, that is, to declare his in-group membership in front of his Arab audience. He is not speaking as a representative of an anti-government group, but rather, as an all-encompassing voice that represents the Arab Muslims as a whole. Presumably his Arab audience will give him much credit as al-Qadi switches from the "they-code" to the "we-code" in the process of language choice, and this will be the "reward" that al-Qadi can expect from indexing one particular element of his identity.

EXAMPLE FOUR

This episode was aired on November 20, 2001, one week after one US Air Force aircraft bombed al-Jazeera's Kabul office. One of the two guests is Christopher Ross, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria. When he guested this program in 2001, he served as the U.S. State Department counterterrorism coordinator. The other guest is Ibrahim Alloush, the editor in chief of an Arab think-tank's website, the Free Arab Voice on the Internet. The topic for this episode is the freedom of American media. Al-Qasim first poses a series of questions criticizing the American media for being slanted in favor of US government and against the Arabs. Then, upon using the symbolic "on the other hand,"

al-Qasim begins to offer a sturdy defense of the American media by arguing that the media war is an essential part of the military war and the American media have their right to fashion their coverage to guide and reflect public opinion. The first question al-Qasim asks Christopher Ross is simple and straightforward: Why was al-Jazeera's bureau in Afghanistan bombed? Before Ross gets an opportunity to answer the question, Alloush interrupts in an aggressive and offensive tone, asking whether the bombing of al-Jazeera's bureau in Afghanistan is a prelude for bombing the bureaus of those channels that disagree with the American media. When Ross takes his chance after al-Qasim's prompt interference, he starts with greeting to the host and the audience, manifesting his sociability and his Arab cultural awareness. Al-Qasim's immediate response "thank you" indicates his understanding of this language cue. Then Ross starts his main argument, saying:

> Arfuḍu ṭ-ṭarḥ arfuḍu hādhā ṭ-ṭarḥ, al-Wilāyātu l-Muttaḥidah *ma ʿindahā shayʾ ḍidda… lā* fī Kābūl, *lā* fī Qaṭar, *lā* fī Amrīkā, wa-wujūdī bi-hādhā l-astūdiyū yudill ʿalā innahu hunāka nawʿ mina t-taʿāwun al-iʿlāmī. bi-n-nisbah li-maktab Kābūl, al-Quwwatu l-Amrīkīyah fī Afghānistān tastahdif al-munshaʾāt wa-l-ʿanāṣir al-ʿaskarīyah faqaṭ, lā tastahdifu al-Munshaʾah l-iʿlāmīyah aw ghayraha mina l-munshaʾāt al-madanīyah. Wa-bi-raghm min juhūdinā fī hādhā li-t-tijāh ṭabʿan taḥṣul baʿḍa l-aghlāṭ, baʿḍa l-aghlāṭ fī stiʿmāli l-asliḥah mathalan, wa-lākin li-ḥaddi l-ʾān lā naʿrif mādhā ḥaṣala *bi-ẓ-ẓabuṭ* bi-n-nisbah li-maktab Kābūl, lākin naʿrif… naʿrif tamāma l-maʿrifah annahu lam yakun hādhā l-maktab bayna ahdāfinā, fa-ʿalaynā an nantaẓir *shuwayya* li-naʿrif ma ḥaṣal. (I reject the approach. I reject this approach. The United States *doesn't* have any thing against (al-Jazeera), *not* in Kabul, *not* in Qatar, *not* in America. And my presence in this studio demonstrates that there is a kind of media cooperation

(between the United States and Al-Jazeera). As for (al-Jazeera's) Kabul bureau, the U.S. troops in Afghanistan are targeting the military sites only, not targeting the media sites or other civil sites, and despite our efforts in that regard, there is bound to be some faults in using the weapons for example. But up to this point, we don't know *exactly* how the al-Jazeera bureau was bombed, but we do know for sure that it wasn't among our targets. So let's wait *a little bit* and see what happened.)

The puzzle to be solved in this passage is whether conversational code-switching always serves an expressive function and has pragmatic meaning. The answer seems to be true according to Gumperz. First, in introducing his notion of "metaphorical code-switching," Gumperz stresses that if code-switching does not correspond to changes in situational context, speakers must be manipulating language choice to bring about new contexts and to achieve special communicative effects. Further, in proposing a number of discourse functions of code-switching, Gumperz includes marking interjections or sentence fillers as one example. However, it is argued that code-switching under this category in itself does not denote any discourse effect, but rather, it happens only because the speaker lacks the appropriate terminology in one language which actually possesses it but does not make part of this speaker's repertoire. Thus, under Myers-Scotton's markedness model, we are inclined to argue that Ross's switching from Standard Arabic to Levantine dialect does not convey any implicit information that goes beyond their actual words, nor does it redefine social situations. Recall the motivations that can be suggested for a speaker to switch from one language variety to another. First, we cannot argue that code-switching in this passage carries a social meaning of solidarity. For one thing, it is meaningless to argue that Ross, by using Levantine dialect, is trying to

establish a cultural relationship with a specific group of addressees, namely, the pan-Syrian audience, because the topic of the show and the platform itself, are both pan-Arab rather than regional. For another, if Ross is intended to convey his message of solidarity to the masses, he should choose to use Standard Arabic to signal his shared group membership as an intellectual, because all the participants in this program share the same well-educated background. In the same vein, we cannot argue that Ross's diverging from his addressees' preferred language functions as a means of distancing himself from his audience, because this argument will contradict Ross's claim that his presence in the studio demonstrate a kind of media cooperation between the United States and al-Jazeera. In other words, Ross does not have any intention to distance himself from his Arab audience, but on the contrary, he aims to accommodate to his listeners, and the "right" language variety to use in this case should be Standard Arabic rather than any local dialect. As a result, the only conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that code-switching in this example does not have a social motivation, nor does it denote any communicate effect, but merely out of the speaker's limited linguistic competence.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to explain speakers' engaging in code-switching in the pan-Arab media discourse. The theories and models being discussed here have offered many possible answers. However, it should be noted that code-switching is indeed a highly complex phenomenon and to reliably account for the occurrence of code-switching has proved to be a difficult task.

ACCOUNTING FOR CODE-SWITCHING

In example one, the show host al-Qasim utilizes code-switching from Standard Arabic to Levantine dialect to extend his control over the discussion and here code-switching is used to express his authority as mediator over one of the participants in debate. In example two, al-Saʿdawi consciously switches the code to Egyptian dialect to distance herself from her interlocutors and to put herself closer to her intended audience. Example three demonstrates that code-switching can be utilized to construct and reinforce certain cultural identity and group membership. The last example, on the other hand, seems to reveal that Ross utilizes code-switching only as a strategy to overcome language deficits.

From the examples it can be said that code-switching is a universal phenomenon that is not limited to one speech community. Al-Qasim is a Syrian Druze who has received higher education at an English university; Al-Saʿdawi is a native Egyptian who has extensive experiences in the Western world; Al-Qadi has the Arab African dual identity; Ross is a native American who deeply appreciates the nuances of Arab culture and Arab politics. It thus can be suggested that difference across type of speaker, be it gender, ethnicity, educational background, is not a determining variable that affects the

occurrences of code-switching. In the same vein, it can be argued that different topics for discussion, as well as difference in circumstances, are not determining variables that code-switching depends on. However, an interesting contrast can be made between native speakers of Arabic and those for whom Arabic is not the first language. On the basis of the analyzed texts, although the distinction between the native speakers and non-native speakers does not affect the occurrences of code-switching, it does have an effect on whether code-switching plays a role as a discourse-related cue: For native Arabic speakers code-switching can be manipulated to carry out various communicative functions; for a non-native speaker like Ross, code-switching seems to be no more than a mark of linguistic deficiency.

The question is then raised as to why there is a discrepancy between native speakers' and non-native speakers' ways of using code-switching. A plausible explanation is that native speakers have a good command of the language and are very sensitive to deviations from the "norm." In the process of mixing Standard Arabic and colloquial dialect, native speakers understand the linguistic and cultural subtlety that language contact offers in shaping communicative contexts. Non-native speakers, on the other hand, may not have the capacity to take advantage of the subtle mechanisms of code-switching and play on subtle differences between the two dialects. In other words, for native speakers there is a larger "diglossic" vocabulary pool from which they can draw, but for non-native speakers the totality of their second language repertoire might be smaller. Even if the varieties of the second language are part, rather than total, of the non-native speakers' verbal repertoire, they still may not be proficient in using them appropriately.

Gumperz's interactional sociolinguistic approach has provided the point of departure for Auer and Myers-Scotton, for Gumperz's notion of code-switching has been shared by both of them as a site for constructing meaning through juxtaposition. However, although Gumperz's interactional view of code-switching opens up the possibility of examining code-switching functions directly, the set of categories of functions identified by Gumperz relate more to inter-sentential rather than intra-sentential code-switching, thus making his list of functions less relevant in this study, because most of the incidences of code-switching in the examples are intra-sentential. Further, this categorization of discourse functions does not link the interactional level with broader social relations and some of the functions such as interjections do not reveal much about the speaker's social motivation and the goals he or she wants to achieve. Admittedly, Gumperz in his discussion of the "we-code" and "they-code" builds a link between code-switching and preserving group or cultural identity. Still, it is rather descriptive and too simple to account for the complexity of code-switching as in the analysis it is shown that sometimes a particular code choice does not denote any communicative effect nor redefine the social situation.

Speech accommodation theory is a handy tool to describe the motivations of certain language behavior, either for accommodating addressees or diverging from them. However, it is the sole focus on the addressees that makes the theory limited in scope and irrelevant when code-switching is for the speaker's own communicative goals.

Myers-Scotton's markedness model, reckoning with both the micro and macro levels, seems to be the most comprehensive explanatory theory among alternative theories. However, a major drawback of this model is that by arguing that speakers are rational actors, this model relates speakers' motivations to conscious calculations. This seems to contradict speakers' speech behavior, as many instances of code-switching in

the daily conversation is a product of unconscious language choice. This unconscious code-switching, however, may still convey certain motivations that the speakers themselves may not be aware or take for granted.

Appendix A: A list of episode titles of *The Opposite Direction*

01/06/1998	Shura Councils: A Step to Democracy
01/20/1998	Tribe and Arab Nationalism
01/27/1998	Democracy and Shura in Arab/Islamic Countries
02/03/1998	Relationship between America and Arabs
02/10/1998	Iraq crisis
02/17/1998	Iraq-Kuwait Crisis
02/24/1998	Arab Nationalism
03/10/1998	Situations of Kurds in Iraq
03/18/1998	Evaluation of Western liberalism
03/24/1998	One Year after the Copenhagen Declaration
03/31/1998	Socialism
04/14/1998	Moroccan Opposition
04/21/1998	Arab League
05/05/1998	Women's Issue in the Arab World
05/26/1998	Celebration of the French Campaign in Egypt
06/09/1998	Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb
06/16/1998	Minorities in the Arab world
06/23/1998	Fate of Palestinian Refugees
10/27/1998	Democracy in the Arab world
11/10/1998	Palestinian National Authority and its Dealings with the Resistance
11/24/1998	Israeli Penetration in the Arab Media
01/05/1999	Islam and political systems
01/12/1999	Arab Summit
01/19/1999	Elections in Israel
01/26/1999	Algeria's Elections and the Circumstances
02/02/1999	Is There an Arab Conspiracy against Iraq?
02/09/1999	Hezbollah… Guerrillas or Agents?
02/16/1999	Twenty Years after the Iranian Revolution
02/23/1999	Ocalan, and the Kurdish Issue
03/02/1999	Borders among the Arab States
03/09/1999	International Campaign against Islamists
03/16/1999	Tenth Anniversary of the Establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union
03/23/1999	Relationship between Lebanon and Syria
03/30/1999	Balkan War and the Situation of Serbs
04/06/1999	Arab-Zionist Conflict
04/13/1999	Algeria's Elections and the Circumstances
04/20/1999	Morocco Prevents the Program Opposite Direction from Airing
04/27/1999	The Era of Rebels and the Era of America's Globalization
05/04/1999	Birth Control: Between Conspiracy and Religion
05/11/1999	Arab National Conference
05/18/1999	Hijab Crisis in Turkey
05/25/1999	Sudan and Nimeiri's Return
06/01/1999	The Ocalan Trial (part two)
06/08/1999	The Conflict in Kashmir
06/16/1999	Nasser's Era and the Arab Situation

06/22/1999	Arab Rulers and their Successors
06/29/1999	Ottoman Caliphate… Blessing or curse?
07/06/1999	Ocalan Sentence
07/13/1999	Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process
07/20/1999	Future of the South Lebanon Army
07/27/1999	Is Barak a Man of Peace?
08/03/1999	The Copenhagen Group
08/10/1999	Iraqi Opposition
08/17/1999	Palestinian Factions and Dialogue with the Authority
08/24/1999	The Ninth Anniversary of the Siege of Iraq
08/31/1999	State of Emergency/ Emergency Laws in the Arab Countries
09/07/1999	Armed Struggle Movements in the Arab World
09/14/1999	Referendum on Civil Concord in Algeria
09/21/1999	Colonialism and Arab Regimes
09/28/1999	The Arab boycott of Israel
10/05/1999	Human Rights in the Arab world
10/12/1999	Arab-Israeli Conflict
10/19/1999	Islamic Political Parties in the Arab World
10/26/1999	Tunisia's elections and National Reconciliation
11/02/1999	Military Regime and its Effect on Societies
11/09/1999	The Secret Relationship between Mauritania and Israel
11/16/1999	Attitudes of Muslims toward Chechnya War
11/23/1999	The Sponsorship System and the Theme of Naturalization in the Gulf Countries
11/30/1999	Israel's Attempts to Eliminate the Arabs
12/07/1999	Sudanese Opposition
12/14/1999	American Perception of the Arabs and Muslims
12/28/1999	The Arabs and the Celebration of Twentieth-Century
01/04/2000	Ramadan Celebration
01/11/2000	At the Twelfth Anniversary of the Establishment of Hamas
01/18/2000	Normalization with Israel
01/25/2000	The Syrian-Israeli Negotiations
02/01/2000	Arabic poetry
02/08/2000	The Current Moroccan Regime
02/15/2000	Israel and the European Campaign against Austria
02/22/2000	The Issue of Khula (divorce at the instance of the wife, who must pay a compensation)
02/29/2000	Iran-Iraq War
05/09/2000	Ten Years after Yemeni Unity
05/16/2000	Lebanese Resistance between Supporters and Opponents
05/23/2000	Questionings on al-Jazeera Channel
06/06/2000	Palestinian Issue after the Liberation of South Lebanon
06/20/2000	Arab Attitudes toward the Siege of Iraq
06/27/2000	Arabic song between the old and the new
07/04/2000	Sudan's Amnesty between Support and Opposition
07/25/2000	Islamic movements in Morocco: Reality and Challenges
08/01/2000	Arab Bloc Formation Where to?
08/08/2000	Conflict between Literature and Religion
08/15/2000	Ten Years after Yemeni Unity

08/22/2000	Palestinian Steadfastness in Camp David
08/29/2000	Lebanon's Elections of the Year 2000
09/05/2000	Asian Labor Force on the Gulf and its effects
09/12/2000	Crisis of the relationship between Iraq and Arab League
09/19/2000	Palestinian State and the Mechanisms of Its Establishment
09/26/2000	Peace movements in Israel
10/03/2000	Attitudes of the Arab Street toward what happens in Jerusalem
10/10/2000	Israel's Nazi Barbarism
10/17/2000	Next Arab Summit… Where to?
10/24/2000	Jihad and Its Role in the Face of the Zionist Enemy
10/31/2000	Arab Media and al-Aqsa Intifada
11/07/2000	Lebanon's Elections and Hariri became the Prime Minister
11/14/2000	The Doha Islamic Summit and the Organization of the Islamic Conference
11/21/2000	Democracy of U.S. Elections
11/28/2000	Al-Aqsa Intifada from the Popular Revolution to the Armed Uprising
12/05/2000	Boycotting American Goods: Between Support and Opposition
12/12/2000	American presence in the Gulf region
12/19/2000	Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sudan
12/26/2000	Impact of negotiations on Palestinian Intifada
01/09/2001	Conflict over Western Sahara between Morocco and Polisario
01/16/2001	The Return of Violence to Algeria
01/23/2001	Arab support of the Intifada
01/30/2001	Turkey and Armenian massacres
02/06/2001	The Tenth Anniversary of the Siege of Iraq
02/13/2001	Draft Charter in Bahrain
02/15/2001	Israel and European Democracy
02/20/2001	Human Rights in Tunisia
02/27/2001	Islamic Satellite Channels: Necessity or Luxury
03/06/2001	Sharon Government and the Arab Citizens of Israel
03/13/2001	Cultural, Political and Economic Developments in Syria
03/20/2001	America's Recklessness with the Arab and Their Issues
03/27/2001	The Taliban Movement and the Destruction of Buddhist Statues
04/03/2001	Arab Summits and Systems of Government
04/10/2001	Civil Society in the Arab Countries
04/17/2001	The Arabs and the Palestinian Issue
04/24/2001	Representation of the Maronites in Lebanon
05/01/2001	Arab Citizens of Israel and What is Happening to Their Fellow Palestinians
05/08/2001	Berber Unrest in the Kabyle Region in Algeria
05/15/2001	Zionism and Nazism
05/22/2001	Arab Official and Popular Shameful Silence toward the Intifada
05/29/2001	Mauritanian regime and Arab regimes
06/05/2001	United States of Africa
06/12/2001	The American enemy
06/19/2001	The Abortion of the Intifada
06/26/2001	Arab Oil
07/03/2001	Prosecution of rulers
07/10/2001	Bin Laden and the Arab Despair and the American Fear **
07/17/2001	Amnesty International 40th Anniversary

07/24/2001	International Emergency Forces and Border Espionage
07/31/2001	Western Revolt against Globalization
08/07/2001	Economic Crisis in Lebanon
08/14/2001	Islamic Resistance Movement
08/21/2001	Battle of Freedoms in Lebanon
08/28/2001	Arabic Language
09/04/2001	Global Campaign against Racism
09/18/2001	Explosions of America
09/25/2001	Islamic Groups and the West
10/02/2001	Pakistan and Afghanistan Dilemma
10/09/2001	Alternative to the Taliban's Government
10/16/2001	Expanding Fight against Terrorism
10/23/2001	Arabs and U.S. Campaign against Afghanistan
10/30/2001	Western Democracy and the New War
11/06/2001	Future of Globalization after the Events of America
11/13/2001	Future of Liberation Movements after Accused of Terrorism
11/20/2001	Freedom of American Media
11/27/2001	The Palestinian Cause and Osama Bin Laden
12/04/2001	Can America "Afghanistanize" Iraq?
12/11/2001	Islam with American Directions
12/18/2001	Palestinian Authority and Resistance Movements
12/25/2001	Future of Human Rights Advocates in the Arab world
01/01/2002	Is Intifada a waste of time?
01/08/2002	The Absent role of Arab Parliaments
01/15/2002	U.S Intervention to overthrow governments
01/22/2002	Has Bin Laden harmed or served Islam?
01/29/2002	Arab Armies
02/05/2002	Iraq and Kuwait
02/12/2002	Israeli Army
02/19/2002	Is the Current Century an American One?
02/26/2002	Western Cultural Invasion
03/05/2002	Arab Student Unions
03/12/2002	Full Normalization versus Full Withdrawal
03/19/2002	The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
03/26/2002	Arab Summit in Beirut
04/02/2002	Arming Intifada
04/09/2002	Arab Regimes
04/16/2002	Arab Street
04/23/2002	Arab intellectuals and national issues
04/30/2002	Democracy and Arab reality
05/07/2002	French presidential election
05/14/2002	Israeli blockade of Yasser Arafat
05/21/2002	Importance of the Role of the Boycott Weapon
05/28/2002	Palestinian Intifada
06/04/2002	American Presence in the Gulf
06/11/2002	Arab Rulers and 99.99% of the Votes of People
06/18/2002	Palestinians in Diaspora and the Dream of Return
06/25/2002	Saudi Interest in Palestinian cause

07/02/2002	America: Deriding World's Minds
07/09/2002	Inter-Arab Tourism
07/16/2002	Evaluation of July Revolution
07/23/2002	Arab Ambassadors
07/30/2002	Arab Associations in America
08/06/2002	Jordan's Role in the American Schemes
08/13/2002	Human Development in the Arab World
08/20/2002	Martyrdom Operations
08/27/2002	Sudan and Arab National Security
09/03/2002	Arab-American Relations after September 11
09/17/2002	US Congress and the Syria Accountability Act
09/24/2002	Political Reforms in Bahrain
10/01/2002	Morocco's Elections
10/08/2002	America and the Invasion of Iraq
10/15/2002	Changing Arab and Islamic Education Curricula
10/22/2002	America's Relationship with International Community
10/29/2002	International campaign against Islam and Islamists
11/05/2002	Betting on the Arab Street on the Issue of Iraq
11/12/2002	Afghans and the New Era
11/19/2002	Democracy and the Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction
11/26/2002	America and Democracy in the Arab World
12/03/2002	Kenya Operation and U.S. and Israeli Interests
12/10/2002	President Saddam's Apology to the Kuwaiti People
12/17/2002	Intifada and its impact on the Palestinian people
12/24/2002	Arab View toward the European Union
12/31/2002	Future of the Israeli Labor Party
01/07/2003	North Korea: Challenging America
01/14/2003	Arab Scientific Renaissance
01/21/2003	Arab States and America's Possible Attack on Iraq
01/28/2003	Europe's Resistant Stance to Aggression against Iraq
02/04/2003	American Presence in the Arab Region
02/11/2003	Peninsula's Defense Forces
02/18/2003	Gravity of the American Media War against Iraq
02/25/2003	Why have Arabs become the laughingstock of the world
03/04/2003	Arab People and the Resistance to American Schemes
03/11/2003	Kurds and the Expected Changes in Iraq
03/18/2003	International Rising Alliance against America
05/13/2003	Arab People's Attitudes toward Foreign Occupation
05/20/2003	Arab People's Choices: Between the Ruling Regimes and Colonialism
05/27/2003	Iraqi Opposition and Account Liquidation
06/03/2003	Arab Regimes and Their Attitude toward Islamists
06/10/2003	The American Colonist's Justification
06/17/2003	Palestinian Resistance and Recent Peace Initiatives
06/24/2003	Iranian Student Movements
07/01/2003	Saudi Opposition
07/08/2003	Future of Arab Nationalism
07/15/2003	The United States of America: For it and against it
07/22/2003	Arab Press, the Fourth Power

08/12/2003	Arab Frustration
08/19/2003	Thirteen Years after the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
08/26/2003	Iraqi People and Their Unrestrained Regime
09/02/2003	The Possibility of Resistance to America
09/09/2003	Responsibility for the Events of September 11
09/16/2003	Banishing Yasser Arafat from the Palestinian Territories
09/23/2003	America and Scarecrow of Weapons of Mass Destruction
09/30/2003	Political and Government Reforms in the Arab Countries
10/07/2003	Kurds' Role in the New Era for Iraq
10/14/2003	Failure of Development and Emancipation Projects
10/21/2003	Arab Rejection of American Operation in Iraq
10/28/2003	Reactions to the Statements of Malaysian Prime Minister
11/04/2003	Next presidential election in Mauritania
11/11/2003	Israel: The Greatest Threat to World Peace
11/18/2003	Future of the Baath Party in Iraq
11/25/2003	Iraqi Resistance
12/02/2003	Religious Wars
12/09/2003	Arab Regimes and Oppositions
12/16/2003	Photographing the Arrest of Saddam in a Humiliating Way: A Message to the Arabs
12/23/2003	Arab people and revolutions
12/30/2003	Royal and Republic Regimes in the Arab World
01/06/2004	Muslims' Understanding of Secularism
01/13/2004	Iran and Its Differences with America
01/20/2004	Islamists and Secularists
01/27/2004	Israeli Penetration in Iraq
02/03/2004	Oil Coupon
02/10/2004	Clash of Civilizations
02/17/2004	Curriculum Change
02/24/2004	Future of Arab Media
03/02/2004	Tribal Governance in Iraq
03/09/2004	Comprehensive Resistance
03/16/2004	Middle East Project
03/23/2004	Instability in Syria
03/30/2004	Arab Summit and Reforms in the Arab Countries
04/06/2004	One Year after the Occupation of Iraq
04/13/2004	Arab Silence
04/20/2004	Charity Associations
04/27/2004	Situations in Sudan
05/04/2004	Violent Groups
05/11/2004	Arab Unity
05/18/2004	Arab Prisons
05/25/2004	Future of Reform Projects
06/01/2004	Dialogue of Religions
06/08/2004	Research Centers and Western Studies
06/15/2004	New Arab Liberals
06/22/2004	Conditions in Algeria
06/29/2004	Transfer of Power to Iraqis
07/06/2004	Trial of Saddam Hussein

07/13/2004	Media Standards in the World
07/20/2004	The extension of President Lahoud's Term
07/27/2004	Signs of the Ministerial Reshuffle in Egypt
08/03/2004	Sending Arab and Islamic Forces to Iraq
08/10/2004	Conflict within the Palestinian Authority
08/17/2004	Iraqi Interim Government and Najaf Crisis
08/24/2004	Arabs and Palestinian Issue
08/31/2004	Mauritanian Accusations of Libya
09/07/2004	Amendment to the Arab Constitutions
09/14/2004	Arab sympathy for France
09/21/2004	Abductions of Foreigners in Iraq
09/28/2004	Arab Civil Society Bodies
10/05/2004	Deleting Quranic verses from curriculum
10/12/2004	Four Years after the Al-Aqsa Intifada
10/19/2004	Differences between Morocco and Algeria
10/26/2004	International Pressure on Syria
11/02/2004	U.S. Elections
11/09/2004	Repercussions of Bush's win of second term
11/16/2004	Palestine after Arafat
11/23/2004	Sharm El-Sheikh Conference
11/30/2004	Attack on Islamic Personalities and Sanctities
12/07/2004	Arab Elections
12/14/2004	Arab Rushing into Peace
12/21/2004	The Sole Leader
12/28/2004	Media Globalization
01/04/2005	Human Development Reports
01/11/2005	Iraq's Elections
01/18/2005	Peace agreement in Sudan
01/25/2005	Spain and the Arab Community
02/01/2005	Charity Associations: What for Them and What against Them?
02/08/2005	Conditions in Iraq after the Elections
02/15/2005	Assassination of Rafik Hariri
02/22/2005	America and Iran between Alliance and Enmity
03/01/2005	Security policy and resentment in Lebanon and Syria
03/08/2005	Popular Uprisings
03/15/2005	Relationship between Tyranny and Colonialism in the Arab World
03/22/2005	Hezbollah
03/29/2005	American Invasion of Iraq and Its Impact on the Reforms
04/05/2005	Normalization Majaani
04/12/2005	Islamic American Dialogue
04/19/2005	Trial of Arab Officials in the International Tribunals
04/26/2005	New Liberals: the Fifth Column or the Enlightenment Movement?
05/03/2005	Lebanon after Syrian Withdrawal of Its Troops
05/10/2005	Arab Regimes Using Private Affairs as an Excuse
05/17/2005	UNESCO and Iraqi Antiquities
05/24/2005	Prospects for Change and Reform in Syria
05/31/2005	Political Activity of Muslim Brotherhood
06/03/2005	Rescue Revolution in Sudan ... Trends and Challenges

06/07/2005	Plight of Lebanon: Between External Intervention and the Lebanese Reality
06/14/2005	International Commissions of Inquiry in the Arab World
06/21/2005	Arab Satellite Stations and Broadcasting Absent Minds
06/28/2005	American Laws to Punish Other Countries
07/05/2005	Nature of the Next Arab-Iranian Relations
07/12/2005	Events in London and their Relationship to the War on Terrorism
07/19/2005	Granting Citizenship to Palestinian Refugees
07/26/2005	The West Linking between Islam and Terrorism
08/02/2005	Diplomatic missions in Iraq
08/09/2005	The Western Countries and the Police state
08/16/2005	Dividing Iraq into Federations
08/23/2005	Refusal of the West to Define Terrorism Ft. Stephen Emerson
08/30/2005	The Promised Arab Reforms
09/06/2005	The New Constitution and the Identity of Iraq
09/13/2005	International Attention to the Assassination of Rafik Hariri
09/20/2005	American and Iraqi accusations against Syria
09/27/2005	Algeria and National Reconciliation Pact
10/04/2005	Iranian Penetration in Iraq
10/11/2005	Drafting Iraqi Constitution under Occupation
10/18/2005	Improving the Image of America in the Arab World
10/25/2005	Arab initiative towards Iraq
11/01/2005	Using the Scenario of the Invasion of Iraq with Syria
11/08/2005	The Statements of Iran's President towards Israel
11/15/2005	The Arabs and the Current Crisis in Syria
11/22/2005	Murder and Torture in Iraqi Prisons
11/29/2005	Deletion of Quranic Verses from Curriculum
12/06/2005	Islamists sweeping Arab Elections
12/13/2005	Iraqi Elections between Democracy and Reactionary
12/20/2005	International Legitimacy
12/27/2005	Washington after the Return of Socialism to Latin America
01/03/2006	U.S Pressure under the Pretext of "Spreading Democracy"
01/10/2006	Palestinian Authority and the risk of collapse
01/17/2006	Reconciliation in Morocco
01/24/2006	Legitimacy and Credibility of Elections under Occupation
01/31/2006	Hamas Sweeping the Palestinian elections
02/07/2006	The West and Respecting People's Choices
02/14/2006	Alliance between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement
02/21/2006	A Clash of Civilizations
02/28/2006	Protecting Security and Military Services from Prosecution
03/07/2006	Media Freedom in the West
03/14/2006	France's Earnest Concern over Lebanon
03/21/2006	Globalization and Self-coup
03/28/2006	Arab Summits
04/04/2006	Israeli Democracy
04/11/2006	Power abroad and the Iraq Experience
04/25/2006	Iran Joining the Nuclear Club
05/02/2006	Latin America and Resisting American Hegemony
05/09/2006	Arab States and Hamas

05/16/2006 The Arabs and International Human Rights Council
05/23/2006 Arab Opposition Betting on Washington's Support
05/30/2006 Nationalization of National Wealth in the Era of Globalization
06/06/2006 The West and the Targeting of Arab Media
06/13/2006 The Iraqi Arena after the Killing of Zarqawi
06/20/2006 Buying the World Cup 2006 Broadcasting Rights
06/27/2006 Israeli Penetration in Lebanon
07/04/2006 Resignation of Arab Rulers
07/11/2006 Gulf Women and Political Participation
07/18/2006 Arab position on the Confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel
07/25/2006 The Official Arab Regime and the Liquidation of Resistance Movements
08/01/2006 Syria and Iran's Role in the Lebanese Arena
08/08/2006 Reviving Peace Process
08/15/2006 Deciphering the Myth of the Hebrew State
08/22/2006 Support of the Resistance Movements
08/29/2006 Arab Arms Deals
09/05/2006 New Middle East between Prosperity and Destruction ft. Alberto Fernandez
09/12/2006 Five Years after the Events of September 11
09/19/2006 The Arab World and the Fragmentation Conspiracy
09/26/2006 The Flow of the Western Forces to Lebanon
10/03/2006 Image Oscillation of Israel and Arab Blackout on Israel
10/10/2006 America and Categorizing Arabs into Moderates and Extremists
10/17/2006 The Arabs and Possessing Nuclear Weapons
10/24/2006 Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan
10/31/2006 Nobel Prize and the Political Dimensions
11/07/2006 Ten years of the opposite direction
11/14/2006 Hamas and Recognizing Israel
11/21/2006 Crisis in Lebanon
11/28/2006 Repercussions of Rumsfeld's Resignation
12/05/2006 Palestinian, Iraqi and Lebanese Labor Pains
12/12/2006 Cosmetic Operations in the Arab World
12/19/2006 Music Channels in the Arab World
12/26/2006 Dictatorship or Democracy for the Troubled Countries
01/02/2007 The Declaration on the Execution of Saddam Hussein
01/09/2007 The Islamic Emirates
01/16/2007 Five Years of Guantanamo
01/23/2007 Identity of Sudan
01/30/2007 Iran's Influence in the Arab Region
02/06/2007 Iraq's Death Squads
02/13/2007 Accusing Syria of Fuelling Violence in Iraq
02/20/2007 Dialogue Conferences between America and the Islamic World
02/27/2007 Arab Identity
03/06/2007 International Courts between Independence and Dependence
03/13/2007 Secularism: Solution to Eradicate Sectarianism and Ethnicity
03/20/2007 Future of Iraq's Oil
03/27/2007 Liberal Islam
04/03/2007 The Western Media
04/10/2007 Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia

04/17/2007	America's Credibility in the World
04/24/2007	Western Sahara Issue
05/01/2007	Violence in the Arab Maghreb
05/08/2007	Arab Youth and Issues of the Nation
05/15/2007	Arab Oil between Bless and Curse
05/22/2007	Advocates of Reform and Change in the Middle East
05/29/2007	American Withdrawal from Iraq
06/05/2007	Double Standard of Security Council in Dealing with Crimes
06/12/2007	Dictatorship and the Arab Defeat (inc. culture of defeat)
06/19/2007	Government Crises under Occupation
06/26/2007	Salman Rushdie's British Honor
07/03/2007	The Creative Chaos and the American Project
07/10/2007	Democracy in the Middle East
07/17/2007	Seizing Iraq's Oil
07/24/2007	Crisis for Palestinians at the Rafah Crossing
07/31/2007	American Influence in the Middle East
08/07/2007	Security Council and International Legitimacy
08/14/2007	Arab Artists' Role in the National Action
08/21/2007	Arab Media Security
08/28/2007	The World and its Vision of Democracy
09/04/2007	Phenomenon of Price Rises in the Arab World
09/18/2007	Iraqi Tribes' Alliance with Americans
09/25/2007	Western Campaign against Iran
10/02/2007	America's credibility in the world
10/09/2007	Plan to Divide Iraq
10/16/2007	Attitude of the West toward Arab Renaissance
10/23/2007	Congress Accusing Turkey of Armenian Genocide
10/30/2007	The Arabs between the American Project and the Islamic Project
11/06/2007	Danger of Dividing Africa
11/13/2007	Foreign Arabic-speaking Satellite Channels
11/20/2007	Ruling Panel in Lebanon and Selecting Head of State
11/27/2007	Arab Street and Annapolis Conference
12/04/2007	Israel's Judaism
12/11/2007	Region Crises and US Solutions
12/18/2007	Arab Rushing to Please the United States and Israel
12/25/2007	Hugo Chavez and His Socialist Experience

Appendix B: Translation of the opening questions for episodes analyzed

Example One:

(1) What is this blatant formal Western hypocrisy? Why did they sentence the historian David Irving yesterday to a three-year jail term only for his questioning the number of people who died in the Jewish Holocaust while they consider the action of the Danish newspaper that disgraced the holiest Islamic sanctities simply freedom of expression?
(2) One has to wonder, is there slightest doubt that we are confronting a conflict of civilizations that the arrogant ruling juntas in the West impose upon us?
(3) Haven't the rest of Western newspapers prepared to propagate the Danish abuse (of Islam), thus emphasizing the West's official position on Islam and Muslims?
(4) Another adds, who originated the "Clash of Civilizations" argument? Was this argument originated by Muslims or by the American thinker Samuel Huntington who draws parallels between the new imperialism and what they call globalization? Shouldn't the initiator bear the brunt of blame?
(5) Some Arab leaders call for a dialogue among civilizations. Isn't this kind of fooling themselves?
(6) Isn't it a new Crusade through which masters of the Western world ant to entrap the religion followers into religious conflicts for the purpose of dominance and hegemony?
(7) Hasn't Huntington's theory become marketing for a programmed plan aiming to eliminate Eastern inheritance?
(8) Hasn't France objected to Turkey's joining in the European Union under the pretense that the European Union is a Christian club?
(9) But on the other hand, why accusing the Western thinkers of fabricating conflict of civilizations?
(10) Wasn't the Moroccan thinker al-Mahdi al-Manjara the first who talked about the clash of civilizations three years before Huntington?
(11) Why limiting the conflict between the West and Islam?
(12) Why hasn't Huntington talked about a conflict with Chinese civilization?
(13) Hadn't the term "conflict of civilizations" remained merely conflicts among intellectuals on the pages of newspapers until Bin Laden decided to bomb the World Trade Center's twin towers in America, when the clash of civilizations translated into reality?
(14) Isn't it a conflict between the modern concept of religion within the system of democracy and the concept of totalitarianism represented by political Islam?
(15) Another adds, who attracted the bear to its nobility? Wasn't it al-Qaeda?

Example Two:

(1) How can we Arabs enter the twenty-first century while Arab women are still demanding their basic rights and heavy restrictions are still placed upon them? Some even say that the history of women is really the history of persecution, what are the dimensions of this issue?
(2) Is it just a conflict between men and women or it has social, political, economic and religious dimensions that are intertwined?
(3) Does religion play a role in the oppression of women, as some claim, or religion, for that matter, is innocent?
(4) In the end, if women are the victims are they the victims of outdated customs and traditions?
(5) The question here is why women's liberation movements have failed in the Arab world?
(6) Is it because they went on the wrong direction?

(7) Why did the defense for women, in some cases, resemble the struggle against Colonialism and slavery?
(8) Why do some women's movements become hostile to men as if men are against women?
(9) Is the idea of women's liberation similar to or just part of the Western cultural invasion?
(10) Why do some Western countries support women's conferences in the Arab states?
(11) Is the situation of women in the West much better than that of Arab women?
(12) Didn't women's movements in the West fall out of their concepts that they proposed to liberate women?

Example Three:

(1) Why have Arab gateways fallen one after another?
(2) Yesterday the Eastern gateway Iraq fell and lost its Arab identity and now it's Sudan's turn as the gateway of the Arabs to Africa.
(3) Will Sudan remain Arab after these successive conspiracies to fragmentize it ethnically and religiously?
(4) Will South move to secession after the new wave of mutual accusations between the Southerners and Northerners?
(5) Isn't Darfur in danger after a wedge is driven between Arabs and Africans?
(6) Isn't it incumbent upon the Arabs to preserve the Arabism of Sudan before it is too late?
(7) How are those Sudanese that doubt about the Arab identity of Sudan different from those Iraqis that came at the back of the American tanks and devoted all their efforts to deprive Iraq of its Arab identity?
(8) Doesn't America want to remove Arab and Islamic identity from Sudan and change this identity to a black African identity pro forma and essentially to a Christian Zionist identity?
(9) Why do some people want to Africanize Sudan if millions of Africans feel connected to the Arab culture and proud of it?
(10) But on the other hand, hasn't John Garang stressed that Sudan is non-Arab, that the Arabs are the minority and the majority are black Africans, and that the identity of Sudan is African rather than Arab or Islamic?
(11) Hasn't the late President of Senegal Senghor said that Sudan could have become the best among the Africans if it hasn't chosen to become the worst among the Arabs?
(12) Why do some people want Sudan to become the gateway of the Arabs to Africa while at the same time many Arabs do not recognize Sudan as an Arab entity and do not care about it?
(13) What did Sudanese gain from the so-called Arab League?
(14) Haven't the fewest Arabs bet on Sudan's unity?
(15) Who is the one that welcomed the separatists and embraced the bold non-Arab neighbors of Sudan?

Example Three:

(1) Have the Western media slogan in general and the American media slogan in particular become "No voice is louder than the voice of war"?
(2) Have the Western mass media become mouthpieces for Western governments?
(3) Why have the Western news media lost their abilities to listen to any opposing opinions?
(4) Why was the al-Jazeera bureau in Afghanistan bombed?
(5) Are the Western media really free?
(6) Have the events of America come to expose the falsehood of the Western media?
(7) One of them says that there is always a "Maestro" manipulating the Western media behind the scene in normal conditions, but this Maestro soon come to the fore in difficult time, as what

happens now. Hence some commentators question: Will we see the establishment of ministries of information in the West as we have seen the establishment of the ministries of national security?
(8) Why have we begun to hear of "rapid media deterrence forces" to muffle any voices that fail to please the West?
(9) Has the fig leaf fallen entirely from the Western media?
(10) But on the other hand, isn't the media war an essential part of the military war, making it any country's right to use any means to win the war?
(11) Isn't it the Western media's right to fashion their coverage to adapt to the exceptional circumstances that the United States is going through?
(12) Isn't the overwhelming public opinion supportive of the Western policies at this time, thus making it impossible for the Western media not to conform to the overall atmosphere?
(13) Isn't it very unfair to accuse the Western media of becoming a mouthpiece for the government or public relations machinery?
(14) Isn't it also an exaggeration to assert that the Western media has become a replica of the media under repressive dictatorships that plague the third world?
(15) Why don't we say that the Western mass media is still the best example of free speech?

Bibliography

Ajami, F.. 1999. *The dream palace of the Arabs: A generatio's odyssey*. New York: Vintage Books.

Al-Batal, M.. 1990. Connectives as cohesive elements in a modern expository Arabic text. In *Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics 2,* ed. M. Eid and J. MaCarthy, 234-268. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Al-Jubouri, A.. 1983. The role of repetition in Arabic argumentative discourse. In *English for specific purposes in the Arab world,* ed. J. Swales and H. Mustafa, 99-117. Birmingham, UK: University of Aston.

Amin, H. Y.. 1996. The Middle East and North Africa. In *World broadcasting: A comparative view,* ed. A. Wells, 121-143. London: General Hall Press.

Appel, R., and Muysken, P.. 2006. *Language Contact and Bilingualism*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Argenter, J. A.. 2001. Code-switching and Dialogism: Verbal practices among Catalan Jews in the Middle Ages. *Language in society* 30: 377-402.

Auer, P.. 1984. On the meaning of conversational code-switching. In *Interpretive sociolinguistics,* ed. P. Auer and A. di Luzio, 87-112. Tubingen, Germany: Narr.

Auer, P.. 1992. Introduction: John Gumperz's approach to contextualization. In *The contextualization of language,* ed. P. Auer and A. di Luzio, 1-38. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Bahry, L.. 2001. Elections in Qatar. *Middle East Policy* 6: 88-127.

Beebe, L. M., and Giles, H.. 1984. Speech-accommodation theories: A discussion in terms of second-language acquisition. *International journal of the Sociology of Language* 46: 5-32.

Blom, J. P., and Gumperz, J. J.. 1972. Social meaning in linguistic structures: Code-switching in Norway. In *Directions in sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of communication,* ed. J. J. Gumperz and D. Hymes, 407-434. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bourhis, R. Y., and Giles, H.. (1977). The language of intergroup distinctiveness. In *Language, ethnicity and intergroup relations,* ed. H. Giles, 119-135. London: Academic Press.

Bruss, N.. 1986. Untitled. *TESOL Quarterly* 20(1): 111-116.

Fakhri, A.. 2009. Rhetorical variation in Arabic academic discourse: Humanities versus law. *Journal of Pragmatics* 41: 306–324.

Ferguson, C. A.. 1959. Diglossia. *Word* 15: 325-340.

Fishman, J. A.. 1967. Bilingualism with and without Diglossia; Diglossia with and without Bilingualism. *The Journal of Social Issues* 23: 29-38.

Garfinkel, H.. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Giles, H., Taylor, D. M., and Bourhis, R. Y.. 1973. Towards a theory of interpersonal accommodation through language: Some Canadian data. *Language in Society* 2: 177-92.

Giles, H., Mulac, A., Bradac, J., and Johnson, P.. 1987. Speech accommodation theory: The first decade and beyond. In *Communication yearbook No. 10,* ed. M. L. McLaughlin, 13-48. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Gluth, E.. 2008. *Code-switching: Grammatical, pragmatic and psycholinguistic aspects. An overview paper*. Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag.

Goffman, E.. 1959. *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Gumperz, J. J.. 1972. Communication in multilingual societies. In *Cognitive Anthropology,* ed. S. A. Tyler, 435-448. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Gumperz, J. J.. 1982. *Discourse strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gumperz, J. J.. 1999. On interactional sociolinguistic method. In *Talk, work and institutional order: Discourse in medical, mediation and management settings,* ed. S. Sarangi and C. Roberts, 453-472. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Gumperz, J. J.. 2001. Interactional sociolinguistics: A personal perspective. In *The handbook of discourse analysis,* ed. D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, and H. E. Hamilton, 215-228. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Gumperz, J. J.. 2003. Response essay. In *Language and interaction,* ed. S. Eerdmans, C. Prevignano, and P. J. Thibaults, 105-126. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Haeri, N.. 1996. *The sociolinguistic market of Cairo: Gender, class, and education*. London: Kegan Paul.

Haeri, N.. 2000. Form and Ideology: Arabic Sociolinguistics and beyond. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29: 61-87.

Holes, C.. 1983. Patterns of communal language variation in Bahrain. *Language in society* 12(4): 433-457.

Holes, C.. 1987. *Language variation and change in a modernizing Arab state: The case of Bahrain*. London, New York: Kegan Paul International.

Holes, C.. 1995. *Modern Arabic: Structure, functions and varieties*. London: Longman.

Jacoby, T. A.. 2007. *Bridging the barrier: Israeli unilateral disengagement*. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate.

Jankowski, J. P.. 2001. *Nasser's Egypt, Arab nationalism, and the United Arab Republic*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Johnstone, B.. 1987. Parataxis in Arabic: Modification as a model for persuasion. *Studies in language* 11: 85-98.

Johnstone, B.. 1990. 'Orality' and discourse structure in Modern Standard Arabic. In *Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics I,* ed. M. Eid, 215-233. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Johnstone, B.. 1991. *Repetition in Arabic discourse: Paradigms, syntagms, and the ecology of language*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Kraidy, M. M.. 1998. Broadcasting regulation and civil society in postwar Lebanon. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 42(3): 387-400.

Labov, W.. 1966. *The social stratification of English in New York City*. Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Labov, W.. 1989. The exact description of a speech community: Short a in Philadelphia. In *Language change and variation,* ed. R. Fasold, and D. Schiffrin, 1-57. Washington DC, Georgetown University Press.

Lynch, M.. 2006. *Voices of the new Arab public: Iraq, al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mahmoud, Y.. 1986. Arabic after Diglossia. In *The Fergusonian impact*, ed. C. A. Ferguson, J. A. Fishma, and A. Tabouret-Keller, 239-252. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Makiya, K.. 1998. *Republic of fear: The politics of modern Iraq*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.

Mellor, N.. 2005. *The making of Arab news*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Myers-Scotton, C.. 1993. *Social motivations for code switching: Evidence from Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Myers-Scotton, C., ed. 1998. *Codes and consequences: Choosing linguistic varieties*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Myers-Scotton, C. and Bolonyai, A.. 2001. Calculating speakers: Codeswitching in a rational choice model. *Language in society* 30(1): 1-28.

Rinnawi, K.. 2006. *Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera, and transnational media in the Arab world*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

Shapiro, S. M.. 2005. The war inside the Arab newsroom. *The New York Times Magazine,* January 2.

Suleiman, Y., ed. 1994. *Arabic sociolinguistics: issues & perspectives*. London: Curzon.

Suleiman, Y.. 1999. Language and political conflict in the Middle East: A study in symbolic sociolinguistics. In *Language and society in the Middle East and North Africa: Studies in variation and identity,* ed. Y. Suleiman, 10-37. London: Curzon Press.

Suleiman, Y.. 2003. *The Arabic language and national identity: a study in ideology.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Widdowson, H. G.. 1996. *Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Woolard, K. A.. 2006. Codeswitching. In *A companion to linguistic Anthropology,* ed. A. Duranti, 73-94. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Zughoul, M. R.. 1980. Diglossia in Arabic: Investigating solutions. *Anthropological Linguistics* 22(5): 201-217.

VITA

Mu Tong was born in Zhalute Qi, China on March 13, 1984, son of Chunrong Zhang and Yueliang Tong. After receiving the High School Diploma (2002) at the High School Affiliated to Peking University (China), he attended Peking University from 2002 to 2006. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June 2006, majoring in Arabic Studies and Economics. In August 2006 he entered the Graduate School at the University of Texas to receive a degree of Master of Arts in Arabic Studies.

Permanent address: 36# Bei San Huan Zhong Lu Apt. 1-4-8
Beijing, China 100088

This thesis was typed by the author.